Is reciprocity really outcome-based? A second look at gift-exchange with random shocks
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DOI: 10.1007/s40881-017-0041-2
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- Timothy N. Cason & Lana Friesenand & Lata Gangadharan, 2020. "Inter-firm Social Dilemmas with Agency Risk," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1325, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Andrea Guido & Alejandro Martinez-Marquina & Ryan Rholes, 2020. "Information Asymmetry and Beliefs Reveal Self Interest Not Fairness," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-53, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Matthew Chao, 2018. "Intentions-Based Reciprocity to Monetary and Non-Monetary Gifts," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(4), pages 1-18, September.
- Kandul, Serhiy & Lanz, Bruno & Reins, Evert, 2023.
"Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 52-69.
- Serhiy Kandul & Bruno Lanz & Evert Reins, 2020. "Reciprocity and gift exchange in markets for credence goods," IRENE Working Papers 20-09, IRENE Institute of Economic Research.
- Fooken, Jonas, 2023. "Trusting when risk and ambiguity create opportunities for exploitation," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
- Rudolf Kerschbamer & Regine Oexl, 2023.
"The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(2), pages 468-488, April.
- Rudolf Kerschbamer & Regine Oexl, 2021. "The effect of random shocks on reciprocal behavior in dynamic principal-agent settings," Working Papers 2021-27, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
- Bejarano, Hernán & Corgnet, Brice & Gómez-Miñambres, Joaquín, 2021. "Economic stability promotes gift-exchange in the workplace," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 187(C), pages 374-398.
- Andrea Guido & Alejandro Martinez-Marquina & Ryan Rholes, 2022. "Reference Dependence and the Role of Information Frictions," GREDEG Working Papers 2022-17, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
- Kujansuu, Essi & Schram, Arthur, 2021. "Shocking gift exchange," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 188(C), pages 783-810.
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More about this item
Keywords
Gift-exchange; Principal agent model; Incomplete contracts; Random shocks; Outcome-based reciprocity; Replication study; Laboratory experiment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
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