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Measuring Criminal Spillovers: Evidence from Three Strikes

Author

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  • Tabarrok Alexander

    (George Mason University; Claremont-McKenna College/RAND)

  • Helland Eric

    (George Mason University; Claremont-McKenna College/RAND)

Abstract

California's Attorney General was pleased to announce that "An unintended but positive consequence of 'Three-Strikes' has been the impact on parolees leaving the state....The growth in the number of parolees leaving California is staggering." Law enforcement officers in other states were presumably less pleased. A displaced criminal is a benefit to California but a cost to other states. If such criminal spillovers are important, law enforcement will over-invest in policies that encourage displacement. We test whether California's three-strikes law led to significant criminal spillovers.

Suggested Citation

  • Tabarrok Alexander & Helland Eric, 2009. "Measuring Criminal Spillovers: Evidence from Three Strikes," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 5(1), pages 251-268, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:5:y:2009:i:1:n:11
    DOI: 10.2202/1555-5879.1326
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Radha Iyengar, 2008. "I'd rather be Hanged for a Sheep than a Lamb: The Unintended Consequences of 'Three-Strikes' Laws," NBER Working Papers 13784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Shepherd, Joanna M, 2002. "Fear of the First Strike: The Full Deterrent Effect of California's Two- and Three-Strikes Legislation," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(1), pages 159-201, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexander Tabarrok & Paul Heaton & Eric Helland, 2010. "The Measure of Vice and Sin: A Review of the Uses, Limitations and Implications of Crime Data," Chapters, in: Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. Zimmerman (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Crime, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Ross, Amanda, 2012. "Crime, police, and truth-in-sentencing: The impact of state sentencing policy on local communities," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 144-152.
    3. Mechoulan, Stéphane, 2020. "Civil unrest, emergency powers, and spillover effects: A mixed methods analysis of the 2005 French riots," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 305-326.

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