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The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance

Author

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  • Mungan Murat C.

    (George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Arlington, Virginia 22201-4426, USA)

Abstract

Actors, whether guilty or innocent, may invest in costly measures to reduce their likelihood of being audited. The value of these investments are increasing in the probability with which they expect to be found guilty conditional on being audited. Because strengthening the standard of proof reduces the probability of conviction, it also lowers the investments by actors to reduce their likelihood of being audited. Therefore, when balancing such avoidance costs and deterrence effects, it is optimal to employ a stronger standard than that which maximizes deterrence, namely stronger than preponderance of the evidence.

Suggested Citation

  • Mungan Murat C., 2020. "The Optimal Standard of Proof with Adjudication Avoidance," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 1-7, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:rlecon:v:16:y:2020:i:1:p:7:n:4
    DOI: 10.1515/rle-2019-0019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Claude-Denys Fluet & Murat C. Mungan, 2017. "The Signal-Tuning Function of Liability Regimes," Cahiers de recherche 1707, Centre de recherche sur les risques, les enjeux économiques, et les politiques publiques.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    standard of proof; avoidance; audit; deterrence; evidence; judicial error;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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