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Ist Gesamtschule wirklich besser? Ein Beitrag zur Ordnungspolitik von Schulformen / Are Comprehensive Schools really better?

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  • Schleithoff Fabian

Abstract

Supporters celebrate the integrated comprehensive school (Gesamtschule) in Germany as a superior school type. They argue that performance levels will tend to be higher and the quality of education to be more equal. In this paper a comparative analysis of Abitur exams in North Rhine-Westphalia at grammar schools (Gymnasium) and at integrated comprehensive schools reveals a significant edge in performance at the former school type. Based on these results, an equality-oriented analysis finds that integrated comprehensive schools may create post-school educational inequality among students. The theory of Yardstick Competition serves as an instrument to analyze whether the performance level of integrated comprehensive schools can be adapted to the performance of grammar schools. In this context relative performance budgeting amongst others is identified as a policy recommendation.

Suggested Citation

  • Schleithoff Fabian, 2014. "Ist Gesamtschule wirklich besser? Ein Beitrag zur Ordnungspolitik von Schulformen / Are Comprehensive Schools really better?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 65(1), pages 303-328, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:ordojb:v:65:y:2014:i:1:p:303-328:n:15
    DOI: 10.1515/ordo-2014-0115
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