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Measuring Latent Constructs in Nonprofit Surveys with Item Response Theory: The Example of Political Ideology

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  • Mason Dyana P.

    (Department of Planning, Public Policy and Management, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403-1209, USA)

Abstract

Latent constructs are the unobservable characteristics of individuals, groups and organizations. Although researchers use many tools to measure latent constructs, including scaled-items and factor analysis techniques, this study offers a different way to measure these characteristics in nonprofit research. Using Item Response Theory (IRT), this study develops one approach to measure revealed political ideology among leaders in nonprofit social welfare organizations. This approach can also be used to measure a variety of other constructs that may be difficult to measure through traditional approaches, opening up new lines of inquiry for those who study nonprofit organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Mason Dyana P., 2017. "Measuring Latent Constructs in Nonprofit Surveys with Item Response Theory: The Example of Political Ideology," Nonprofit Policy Forum, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 91-110, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:nonpfo:v:8:y:2017:i:1:p:91-110:n:3
    DOI: 10.1515/npf-2016-0020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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