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The Effects of Interest Groups' Ideology on Their PAC and Lobbying Expenditures

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  • McKay Amy

    (Georgia State University)

Abstract

While the literature on political action committees' (PACs) contributions to congressional campaigns is substantial, one key variable has been missing: the ideology of the PAC. Such a measure is needed to evaluate a normatively important yet unanswered question: to what extent do PACs give to candidates with whom they agree ideologically, as opposed to candidates they may want to influence after the election? This study shows that many interest groups' preferences for an electoral strategy or an access strategy can be predicted by their left-right ideology and their level of ideological extremism. The analysis finds that more ideologically extreme groups and more liberal groups spend more money on PAC contributions relative to lobbying. Further, groups' underlying left-right ideology is also highly predictive of their allocation of PAC contributions between the two parties-even controlling for group type.

Suggested Citation

  • McKay Amy, 2010. "The Effects of Interest Groups' Ideology on Their PAC and Lobbying Expenditures," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 1-23, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:buspol:v:12:y:2010:i:2:n:4
    DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1306
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Mason Dyana P., 2015. "Advocacy in Nonprofit Organizations: A Leadership Perspective," Nonprofit Policy Forum, De Gruyter, vol. 6(3), pages 297-324, November.
    3. Lskavyan, Vahe, 2014. "Donor–recipient ideological differences and economic aid," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 123(3), pages 345-347.
    4. Clark Muntean Susan, 2011. "Corporate Independent Spending in the Post-BCRA to Pre-Citizens United Era," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-39, April.
    5. Yiran Chen & Hanming Fang, 2017. "Inferring the Ideological Affliations of Political Committees via Financial Contributions Networks," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-022, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 10 Dec 2017.
    6. Freille, S. & Avramovich, C. & Moncarz, P. & Sofietti, P., 2019. "Inside the revolving door: campaign finance, lobbying meetings and public contracts. An investigation for Argentina," Research Department working papers 1392, CAF Development Bank Of Latinamerica.
    7. Mason Dyana P., 2017. "Measuring Latent Constructs in Nonprofit Surveys with Item Response Theory: The Example of Political Ideology," Nonprofit Policy Forum, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 91-110, January.
    8. Brown Richard S., 2016. "How do firms compete in the non-market? The process of political capability building," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 263-295, October.

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