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Regulator preferences and lobbying efforts in rent-seeking contests

In: Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions

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  • Juan D. Montoro-Pons

Abstract

This extensive book explores in detail a wide range of topics within the public choice and constitutional political economy tradition, providing a comprehensive overview of current work across the field.

Suggested Citation

  • Juan D. Montoro-Pons, 2013. "Regulator preferences and lobbying efforts in rent-seeking contests," Chapters, in: Francisco Cabrillo & Miguel A. Puchades-Navarro (ed.), Constitutional Economics and Public Institutions, chapter 14, pages 257-278, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14863_14
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    File URL: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781781003961.00025.xml
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Linster, Bruce G, 1993. "Stackelberg Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(2), pages 307-321, October.
    2. van Winden, Frans, 1999. "On the Economic Theory of Interest Groups: Towards a Group Frame of Reference in Political Economics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 100(1-2), pages 1-29, July.
    3. Elie Appelbaum & Eliakim Katz, 1986. "Transfer seeking and avoidance: On the full social costs of rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 175-181, January.
    4. repec:bla:ecorec:v:65:y:1989:i:188:p:32-50 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Johnson, Paul E., 1990. "Asymmetries in political entry," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 377-396, December.
    6. McKay Amy, 2010. "The Effects of Interest Groups' Ideology on Their PAC and Lobbying Expenditures," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 12(2), pages 1-23, August.
    7. Mark Gradstein, 1995. "Intensity Of Competition, Entry And Entry Deterrence In Rent Seeking Contests," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 79-91, March.
    8. McKay, Amy, 2010. "The Effects of Interest Groups' Ideology on Their PAC and Lobbying Expenditures," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(2), pages 1-21, August.
    9. Kooreman, Peter & Schoonbeek, Lambert, 1997. "The specification of the probability functions in Tullock's rent-seeking contest," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 59-61, September.
    10. Michael A. Brooks & Ben J. Heudra, 1989. "An Exploration of Rent Seeking," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 65(1), pages 32-50, March.
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