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Political Turnover and Public Health Provision in Brazilian Municipalities

Author

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  • de Araújo Jevuks Matheus

    (Department of Economics, Federal University of Paraiba, João Pessoa, 58052-320, Brazil)

  • Machoski Eduarda

    (Department of Economics, Federal University of Paraiba, João Pessoa, Brazil)

  • Melo Ana Karolina Acris

    (Department of Economics, Federal University of Paraiba, João Pessoa, Brazil)

Abstract

The objective of this work is to estimate the effects of political turnover on municipal health indicators. For this purpose, we used a regression discontinuity design applied to a pool of data on close municipal elections that occurred in 2008 and 2012. The outcome variables tested were municipal health indicators observed 1 and 3 years after the elections. We assume that the change of parties in the leadership of the municipal executive power alters the managers and public health policies and, therefore, affects the indicators of this sector. Our results indicate that health indicators linked to administrative issues appeared to benefit from political turnover in the period immediately after the elections (1 year). These results were corroborated by our additional estimates (robustness). We highlight that the number of health workers and coverage of primary care remained better 3 years after the elections in municipalities that suffered political turnover, indicating that this improvement resulting from the change in management may not be transient. Finally, through averaging tests, we found that in municipalities where the incumbent lost the election and there was a turnover, health managers were more qualified, and there was greater creation of basic health units.

Suggested Citation

  • de Araújo Jevuks Matheus & Machoski Eduarda & Melo Ana Karolina Acris, 2024. "Political Turnover and Public Health Provision in Brazilian Municipalities," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment Journal, De Gruyter, vol. 18(1), pages 1-23, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:bpj:econoa:v:18:y:2024:i:1:p:23:n:1
    DOI: 10.1515/econ-2022-0058
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mitra Akhtari & Diana Moreira & Laura Trucco, 2022. "Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 442-493, February.
    2. David Albouy, 2013. "Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(1), pages 127-141, March.
    3. Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
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