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Global value chains and corporate lobbying for trade liberalization

Author

Listed:
  • Ka Zeng

    (University of Arkansas)

  • Karen Sebold

    (University of Arkansas)

  • Yue Lu

    (University of International Business and Economics)

Abstract

This paper examines the influence of growing global value chain (GVC) integration on the pattern of corporate lobbying for trade liberalization in the United States. We hypothesize that industries with a higher level of foreign content embodied in their exports should be more likely to support trade liberalization. This is because reduced tariff barriers should substantially reduce both the costs of inputs for such industries and the rents that may be obtained through protectionist policies. We test our hypotheses through an examination of the lobbying and election funding activities of the Fortune 500 companies in the U.S. between 2006 and 2012, using the debate over the Trans-Pacific Partnership to orient our analysis. Research findings, which corroborate our main hypotheses, point to the need to revisit conventional models of industry demand for trade liberalization in light of the growing integration of trade, production, and investment activities in the global economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Ka Zeng & Karen Sebold & Yue Lu, 2020. "Global value chains and corporate lobbying for trade liberalization," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 409-443, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:15:y:2020:i:2:d:10.1007_s11558-018-9337-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-018-9337-0
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    2. Woocheol Lee, 2023. "Trade Liberalization, Distributional Coalitions and Economic Growth: A Case of Vietnam," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(14), pages 1-19, July.

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