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Non-Congruent Views about Signal Precision in Collective Decisions

Author

Listed:
  • Pan Addison

    (Department of Economics and Centre for Mathematical Social Science, The University of Auckland, and ATE Research Network, Owen G Glenn Building. 12 Grafton Rd, 1010Auckland, New Zealand)

  • Fabrizi Simona

    (Department of Economics and Centre for Mathematical Social Science, The University of Auckland, and ATE Research Network, Owen G Glenn Building. 12 Grafton Rd, 1010Auckland, New Zealand)

  • Lippert Steffen

    (Department of Economics and Centre for Mathematical Social Science, The University of Auckland, and ATE Research Network, and Te Pūnaha Matatini and Public Policy Institute, University of Auckland, Owen G Glenn Building, 12 Grafton Rd, 1010Auckland, New Zealand)

Abstract

We relax the standard assumptions in collective decision-making models that voters can not only derive a perfect view about the accuracy of the information at their disposal before casting their votes, but can, in addition, also correctly assess other voters’ views about it. We assume that decision-makers hold potentially differing views, while remaining ignorant about such differences, if any. In this setting, we find that information aggregation works well with voting rules other than simple majority: as voters vote less often against their information than in conventional models, they can deliver higher-quality decisions, including in the canonical 12 jurors case. We obtain voting equilibria with many instances, in which other voting rules, including unanimity, clearly outperform simple majority.

Suggested Citation

  • Pan Addison & Fabrizi Simona & Lippert Steffen, 2018. "Non-Congruent Views about Signal Precision in Collective Decisions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-24, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:18:y:2018:i:2:p:24:n:15
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2016-0185
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Simona Fabrizi & Steffen Lippert & Addison Pan & Matthew Ryan, 2022. "A theory of unanimous jury voting with an ambiguous likelihood," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(3), pages 399-425, October.
    2. Guha, Brishti, 2022. "Ambiguity aversion, group size, and deliberation: Costly information and decision accuracy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 201(C), pages 115-133.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    group decision-making; voting rules; non-congruent views; jury trial; referenda; simulations; human-subjects laboratory experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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