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Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior

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  • Mamoru Kaneko
  • J. Kline

Abstract

We explore the inductively derived views obtained by players with partial temporal (short-term) memories. A player derives his personal view of the objective game situation from his accumulated (long-term) memories, and then uses it for decision making. A salient feature that distinguishes this paper from others on inductive game theory is partiality of a memory function of a player. This creates a multiplicity of possibly derived views. Although this is a difficulty for a player in various senses, it is an essential problem of induction. Faced with multiple possible views, a player may try to resolve this using further experiences. The two-way interaction between behavior and personal views is another distinguishing feature of the present paper. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Mamoru Kaneko & J. Kline, 2013. "Partial memories, inductively derived views, and their interactions with behavior," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 27-59, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:1:p:27-59
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0519-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Piccione, Michele & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1997. "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 3-24, July.
    2. Sergiu Hart, 2006. "Robert Aumann's Game and Economic Theory," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 185-211, July.
    3. Mamoru Kaneko & Akihiko Matsui, 1999. "Inductive Game Theory: Discrimination and Prejudices," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 101-137, January.
    4. repec:bla:jpbect:v:1:y:1999:i:1:p:101-37 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Kaneko, Mamoru & Kline, J. Jude, 2008. "Inductive game theory: A basic scenario," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(12), pages 1332-1363, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. J. Jude Kline & Shravan Luckraz, 2016. "Equivalence between graph-based and sequence-based extensive form games," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 85-94, April.
    2. J. Jude Kline & Thierry Lavendhomme & Samuel Waltener, 2019. "From memories to inductively derived views: a constructive approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(2), pages 403-420, September.
    3. Daniel Monte & Maher Said, 2014. "The value of (bounded) memory in a changing world," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 59-82, May.
    4. Pan Addison & Fabrizi Simona & Lippert Steffen, 2018. "Non-Congruent Views about Signal Precision in Collective Decisions," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(2), pages 1-24, July.
    5. Mamoru Kaneko, 2013. "Symposium: logic and economics—interactions between subjective thinking and objective worlds," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(1), pages 1-8, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Inductive game theory; Partial memory; Inductive derivation; Mike’s bike; C70; C72; C79;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other

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