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Managerial Collusive Behavior under Asymmetric Incentive Schemes

Author

Listed:
  • Guigou Jean-Daniel

    (Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg, Walferdange, Luxembourg)

  • de Lamirande Patrick

    (Cape Breton University, 250 Grand Lake Road, Sydney, NS B1R 2H8, Canada)

Abstract

We analyze the effects of asymmetry in incentive contracts on the possibility of collusion between managers. When their compensation is based on the relative performance evaluation contracts, managers can achieve better outcomes by colluding. Using the concept of balanced temptation introduced by Friedman (1971), we find that asymmetry in incentives increases the likelihood of collusion. The result contradicts the general wisdom that asymmetries make collision harder to maintain.

Suggested Citation

  • Guigou Jean-Daniel & de Lamirande Patrick, 2015. "Managerial Collusive Behavior under Asymmetric Incentive Schemes," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 15(2), pages 333-350, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:15:y:2015:i:2:p:333-350:n:12
    DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2014-0079
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Sung Wook Joh, 1999. "Strategic Managerial Incentive Compensation In Japan: Relative Performance Evaluation And Product Market Collusion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(2), pages 303-313, May.
    3. Jeanine Miklós-Thal, 2011. "Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 46(1), pages 99-125, January.
    4. David Collie, 2004. "Sustaining Collusion With Asymmetric Costs," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 155, Royal Economic Society.
    5. João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho, 2012. "The profit-sharing rule that maximizes sustainability of cartel agreements," FEP Working Papers 463, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    6. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(6), pages 1999-2043, December.
    7. Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 163-198, December.
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