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Fiscal Indulgence In Central Europe: Loss Of The External Anchor?

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  • Helge Berger
  • George Kopits
  • István P. Székely

Abstract

In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences among countries on the path to European Union (EU) accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game‐theoretic model illustrates why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy regimes – allowing for regime shifts – depending on country characteristics and EU policies.

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  • Helge Berger & George Kopits & István P. Székely, 2007. "Fiscal Indulgence In Central Europe: Loss Of The External Anchor?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 54(1), pages 116-135, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:scotjp:v:54:y:2007:i:1:p:116-135
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9485.2007.00407.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Juan Carlos Cuestas & Karsten Staehr, 2013. "Fiscal shocks and budget balance persistence in the EU countries from Central and Eastern Europe," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(22), pages 3211-3219, August.
    2. Kocenda, Evzen & Kutan, Ali M. & Yigit, Taner M., 2006. "Pilgrims to the Eurozone: How far, how fast?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 311-327, December.
    3. Philipp Paulus, 2006. "The final blow to the Stability Pact? EMU enlargement and government debt," Otto-Wolff-Institut Discussion Paper Series 03/2006, Otto-Wolff-Institut für Wirtschaftsordnung, Köln, Deutschland.
    4. Rupa Duttagupta & Mr. Guillermo Tolosa, 2006. "Fiscal Discipline and Exchange Rate Regimes: Evidence From the Caribbean," IMF Working Papers 2006/119, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Matthias Bauer, 2013. "Political Aversion To a Multilateral Fiscal Rule: The Dynamic Commitment Problem in European Fiscal Governance," Global Financial Markets Working Paper Series 44-2013, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    6. Staehr, Karsten, 2008. "Fiscal policies and business cycles in an enlarged euro area," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 46-69, March.
    7. Kocenda, Evzen & Kutan, Ali M. & Yigit, Taner M., 2008. "Fiscal convergence in the European Union," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 319-330, December.
    8. Ayala, Astrid & Blazsek, Szabolcs, 2013. "Structural breaks in public finances in Central and Eastern European countries," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 45-60.
    9. Kopits, György & Romhányi, Balázs, 2010. "A Költségvetési Tanács indulásának tanulságai [Hungarys Fiscal Council: Early lessons]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 573-590.
    10. Rafal Benecki & Jens Hölscher & Mariusz Jarmuzek, 2006. "Fiscal Transparency and Policy Rules in Poland," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0327, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
    11. Andrew Hughes Hallett & John Lewis, 2005. "Fiscal Discipline before and after EMU - Permanent Weight Loss or Crash Diet?," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0516, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    12. Tanja A. Börzel & Thomas Risse, 2009. "The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas," KFG Working Papers p0001, Free University Berlin.
    13. Ringa Raudla, 2010. "Governing budgetary commons: what can we learn from Elinor Ostrom?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 201-221, December.
    14. Mr. Anthony M Annett, 2006. "Enforcement and the Stability and Growth Pact: How Fiscal Policy Did and Did Not Change Under Europe’s Fiscal Framework," IMF Working Papers 2006/116, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Srđan Redžepagić & Matthieu Llorca, 2007. "Does Politics Matter in the Conduct of Fiscal Policy? Political Determinants of the Fiscal Sustainability: Evidence from Seven Individual Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC)," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 54(4), pages 489-500, December.
    16. George Kopits, 2007. "Fiscal Responsibility Framework: International Experience and Implications for Hungary," MNB Occasional Papers 2007/62, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary).
    17. repec:bil:bilpap:0501 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. Mikek, Peter, 2008. "Alternative monetary policies and fiscal regime in new EU members," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 335-353, December.
    19. Kutan, Ali M. & Yigit, Taner M., 2005. "Real and nominal stochastic convergence: Are the new EU members ready to join the Euro zone?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 387-400, June.
    20. John Lewis, 2007. "Fiscal policy in central and Eastern Europe: what happened in the run-up to EU accession?," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 15-31, April.
    21. Przemysław Pacześ, 2012. "Polityczny cykl koniunkturalny w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej [ Political Business Cycle in Central and Eastern Europe ]," Prace i Materiały, Instytut Rozwoju Gospodarczego (SGH), vol. 88(1), pages 119-139.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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