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Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance

Author

Listed:
  • Dogan, Battal

    (Department of Economics, University of Bristol)

  • Ehlers, Lars

    (Département de sciences économiques and CIREQ, Université de Montréal)

Abstract

We investigate efficient and minimally unstable Pareto improvements over the deferred acceptance (DA) mechanism-a popular school choice mechanism which is stable but not efficient. We show that there is no Pareto improvement over the DA mechanism which is minimally unstable among efficient assignments when the stability comparison is based on counting the number of blocking pairs. Our main result characterizes the priority profiles for which there exists a Pareto improvement over the DA assignment that is minimally unstable among efficient assignments. We further consider an alternative natural stability comparison based on the set of blocking students who are involved in at least one blocking pair, show that the impossibilities remain, and characterize the possibility domain of priority profiles.

Suggested Citation

  • Dogan, Battal & Ehlers, Lars, 2021. "Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 16(4), November.
    • Handle: RePEc:the:publsh:4257
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ata Atay & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2022. "Limited Farsightedness in Priority-Based Matching," Papers 2212.07427, arXiv.org.
    2. Rodríguez-Álvarez, Carmelo & Romero-Medina, Antonio, 2024. "School choice with transferable student characteristics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 103-124.
    3. Kirill Rudov, 2024. "Fragile Stable Matchings," Papers 2403.12183, arXiv.org.
    4. Pierre Callataÿ & Ana Mauleon & Vincent Vannetelbosch, 2024. "Minimal farsighted instability," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 493-523, June.
    5. Mustafa Oğuz Afacan & Umut Dur, 2023. "Strategy‐proof size improvement: is it possible?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 125(2), pages 321-338, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    School choice; deferred acceptance; stability comparisons; cardinal minimal instability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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