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Climate Policy and Moral Consumers

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  • Thomas Eichner
  • Rüdiger Pethig

Abstract

This paper analyzes climate policy (in the form of emissions caps) in a multi‐country game when consumers have preferences with different degrees of morality. In the absence of climate policy, the larger the consumers’ degree of morality, the lower the energy consumption and climate damage. Moral consumer‐voters elect either emissions caps (direct democracy) under majority rule, or policymakers who then choose emissions caps (representative democracy). If voters take prices as given, then election‐winning emissions caps are tighter, the lower the median voters’ degree of morality. If voters seek to influence prices in their favor, then strong strategic price effects are generated and the election‐winning emissions caps are less stringent, the lower the median voters’ degree of morality. We also show that the morality of election‐winning policymakers differs from the morality of median voters. It is possible that a moral median voter elects a policymaker with zero morality who then implements an emissions cap that might be larger than emissions in the absence of climate policy.

Suggested Citation

  • Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2021. "Climate Policy and Moral Consumers," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(4), pages 1190-1226, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:123:y:2021:i:4:p:1190-1226
    DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12450
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2024. "How Important Are IEAs for Mitigation If Countries Are of the Homo Moralis Type?," CESifo Working Paper Series 11040, CESifo.
    2. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2024. "International environmental agreements when countries behave morally," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    3. Zehui, Zhao, 2023. "Pro-Environmental Behavior and Actions: A Review of the Literature," OSF Preprints cajup, Center for Open Science.
    4. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2022. "Kantians defy the economists’ mantra of uniform Pigovian emissions taxes," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 200(C).
    5. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2022. "International Environmental Agreements When Countries Behave Morally," CESifo Working Paper Series 10090, CESifo.
    6. Alistair Ulph & David Ulph, 2024. "International Cooperation and Kantian Moral Behaviour: Complements or Substitutes?," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 87(9), pages 2205-2228, September.
    7. Zehui, Zhao, 2023. "Pro-Environmental Behavior and Actions: Review of current theories and agenda for future research," SocArXiv p27hb, Center for Open Science.
    8. Alistair Ulph & David Ulph, 2023. "International Cooperation and Kantian Moral Behaviour – Complements or Substitutes?," Economics Discussion Paper Series 2302, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    9. Zehui, Zhao, 2023. "Pro-Environmental Behavior and Actions: Review of the literature and agenda for future research," OSF Preprints hszge, Center for Open Science.

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