IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/6333.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies

Author

Listed:
  • Hattori, Keisuke

Abstract

In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of international noncooperative environmental policymaking, and examine the strategic incentives for voters to elect an environmental policymaker in open economies. We show that under several circumstances, citizens have an incentive to deliberately vote for a candidate whose environmental preferences differ from their own. Further, the strategic voting incentives are crucially depend on the environmental policy tools employed by the government, the international market structures, and the degree of product differentiation among firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Hattori, Keisuke, 2007. "Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies," MPRA Paper 6333, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6333
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6333/1/MPRA_paper_6333.pdf
    File Function: original version
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Murdoch, James C. & Sandler, Todd, 1997. "The voluntary provision of a pure public good: The case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 331-349, February.
    2. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    3. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2002. "Market Structure and Environmental Innovation," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 5, pages 293-325, November.
    4. Roelfsema, Hein, 2007. "Strategic delegation of environmental policy making," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 270-275, March.
    5. Hamilton, Stephen F. & Requate, Till, 2004. "Vertical structure and strategic environmental trade policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 260-269, March.
    6. Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 2004. "The Political Economy of Environmental Policy," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 1, pages 3-30, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Robert Innes & Joseph J Bial, 2002. "Inducing Innovation in the Environmental Technology of Oligopolistic Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 265-287, September.
    8. Wolfgang Buchholz & Kai Konrad, 1994. "Global environmental problems and the strategic choice of technology," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(3), pages 299-321, October.
    9. Ulph, Alistair, 1998. "Political institutions and the design of environmental policy in a federal system with asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 583-592, May.
    10. Emmanuel Petrakis & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis & Anastasios Xepapadeas (ed.), 1999. "Environmental Regulation and Market Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1553.
    11. Kennedy Peter W., 1994. "Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economies with Imperfect Competition," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 49-63, July.
    12. Avinash Dixit, 1979. "A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 20-32, Spring.
    13. John A. List & Shelby Gerking, 2000. "Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the United States," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 453-471, August.
    14. Martin L. Weitzman, 1974. "Prices vs. Quantities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(4), pages 477-491.
    15. Congleton, Roger D, 1992. "Political Institutions and Pollution Control," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(3), pages 412-421, August.
    16. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-940, December.
    17. Schleich, Joachim, 1999. "Environmental quality with endogenous domestic and trade policies1," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 53-71, March.
    18. Fredriksson, Per G. & Millimet, Daniel L., 2002. "Strategic Interaction and the Determination of Environmental Policy across U.S. States," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 101-122, January.
    19. Didier Laussel & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "The sources of protectionist drift in representative democracies," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 14, pages 225-246, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    20. Werner Antweiler & Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, 2001. "Is Free Trade Good for the Environment?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 877-908, September.
    21. Rauscher, Michael, 1997. "International Trade, Factor Movements, and the Environment," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198290506.
    22. K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), 2003. "Handbook of Environmental Economics," Handbook of Environmental Economics, Elsevier, edition 1, volume 1, number 1.
    23. Rauscher, Michael, 2005. "International Trade, Foreign Investment, and the Environment," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1403-1456, Elsevier.
    24. Per G. Fredriksson, 1999. "The Political Economy of Trade Liberalization and Environmental Policy," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 513-535, January.
    25. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
    26. repec:bla:jindec:v:50:y:2002:i:3:p:265-87 is not listed on IDEAS
    27. Daniel L. Millimet, 2003. "Assessing the Empirical Impact of Environmental Federalism," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(4), pages 711-733, November.
    28. Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406.
    29. Juan-Pablo Montero, 2002. "Market Structure and Environmental Innovation," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(2), pages 293-325, November.
    30. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 2003. "Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2611-2637, December.
    31. Spence, Michael, 1976. "Product Differentiation and Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 407-414, May.
    32. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, April.
    33. Alistair fnUlph, 1996. "Environmental policy instruments and imperfectly competitive international trade," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 7(4), pages 333-355, June.
    34. Wolfgang Buchholz & Alexander Haupt & Wolfgang Peters, 2005. "International Environmental Agreements and Strategic Voting," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 107(1), pages 175-195, March.
    35. Fredriksson, Per G., 1997. "The Political Economy of Pollution Taxes in a Small Open Economy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 44-58, May.
    36. Siqueira, Kevin, 2003. "International externalities, strategic interaction, and domestic politics," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 674-691, May.
    37. Roger Congleton, 2004. "The Political Economy of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 213-238, October.
    38. David M. Kreps & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1983. "Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield Cournot Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 326-337, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yukihiro Nishimura & Kimiko Terai, 2017. "Strategic delegation when public inputs for a global good are imperfect substitutes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(1), pages 96-111, February.
    2. Arvaniti, Maria & Habla, Wolfgang, 2021. "The political economy of negotiating international carbon markets," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    3. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2018. "Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 244-250.
    4. Bontems, Philippe & Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Hafidi, Houda, 2024. "Environmental Tax Competition and Welfare: The Good News about Lobbies," TSE Working Papers 24-1551, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    5. Ogawa, Hikaru, 2021. "Partial environmental tax coordination and political delegation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    6. Thomas Eichner & Rüdiger Pethig, 2021. "Climate Policy and Moral Consumers," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(4), pages 1190-1226, October.
    7. Kimiko Terai, 2012. "Financial Mechanism and Enforceability of International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(2), pages 297-308, October.
    8. Keisuke Hattori & Takahiro Kitamura, 2013. "Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 55(2), pages 199-215, June.
    9. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2015. "Strategic Delegation and Non-cooperative International Permit Markets," Working Papers in Economics 636, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    10. Spycher, Sarah & Winkler, Ralph, 2022. "Strategic delegation in the formation of modest international environmental agreements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 141(C).
    11. Alban Thomas & Vera Zaporozhets, 2017. "Bargaining Over Environmental Budgets: A Political Economy Model with Application to French Water Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 68(2), pages 227-248, October.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Roelfsema, Hein, 2007. "Strategic delegation of environmental policy making," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 270-275, March.
    2. Brian R. Copeland & M. Scott Taylor, 2004. "Trade, Growth, and the Environment," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(1), pages 7-71, March.
    3. Requate, Till, 2005. "Environmental Policy under Imperfect Competition: A Survey," Economics Working Papers 2005-12, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.
    4. Rauscher, Michael, 2001. "International trade, foreign investment, and the environment," Thuenen-Series of Applied Economic Theory 29, University of Rostock, Institute of Economics.
    5. Sturm, Daniel & Ulph, Alistair, 2002. "Environment, trade, political economy and imperfect information: a survey," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0204, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    6. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2018. "Strategic delegation and international permit markets: Why linking May fail," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 244-250.
    7. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulations," RFF Working Paper Series dp-04-12, Resources for the Future.
    8. Fredriksson, Per G. & Matschke, Xenia & Minier, Jenny, 2010. "Environmental policy in majoritarian systems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 177-191, March.
    9. Leo Wangler & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2013. "The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 387-403, September.
    10. Kammerlander, Andreas & Schulze, Günther G., 2020. "Are Democracies Cleaner?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 64(C).
    11. Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney & Wallace E. Oates & Paul R. Portney, 2004. "The Political Economy of Environmental Policy," Chapters, in: Environmental Policy and Fiscal Federalism, chapter 1, pages 3-30, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Haiqing Hu & Di Chen & Chun‐Ping Chang & Yin Chu, 2021. "The Political Economy Of Environmental Consequences: A Review Of The Empirical Literature," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(1), pages 250-306, February.
    13. Requate, Till, 2005. "Dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments--a survey," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2-3), pages 175-195, August.
    14. Olper, Alessandro, 2017. "The political economy of trade-related regulatory policy: environment and global value chain," Bio-based and Applied Economics Journal, Italian Association of Agricultural and Applied Economics (AIEAA), vol. 5(3), February.
    15. Popp, David & Newell, Richard G. & Jaffe, Adam B., 2010. "Energy, the Environment, and Technological Change," Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, in: Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Innovation, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 873-937, Elsevier.
    16. Akira Miyaoka, 2019. "The Signaling Effect of Emission Taxes Under International Duopoly," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(3), pages 691-720, March.
    17. Guillaume Cheikbossian, 2016. "The political economy of (De)centralization with complementary public goods," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 315-348, August.
    18. Hilary Sigman, 2007. "Decentralization and Environmental Quality: An International Analysis of Water Pollution," NBER Working Papers 13098, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Dapeng Cai & Jie Li, 2020. "Pollution for Sale: Firms’ Characteristics and Lobbying Outcome," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 77(3), pages 539-564, November.
    20. Eliste, Paavo & Fredriksson, Per G., 2002. "Environmental Regulations, Transfers, and Trade: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 234-250, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    strategic voting; the race to the bottom; market structure; environmental policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6333. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Joachim Winter (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/vfmunde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.