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Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective

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  • Yasheng Huang

Abstract

Conventional analysis of government typically focuses on ‘politics’, that is, interests, conflicts or personalities. But governing a country is not only a task of successfully governing its people but also an administrative task of managing subordinate officials. This is a very relevant issue in a country such as China, with a massive bureaucracy. The top ‘managers’ of the country – some 30 national leaders – make policies but also manage a large number of bureaucratic personnel. As in business organizations, control problems occur when subordinates have different interests from those of the organization and when the behavior of subordinates is imperfectly monitored. Control mechanisms are designed to minimize such problems by either aligning interests or improving information. This article uses this framework to explain a wide variety of administrative phenomena in Chinese government organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Yasheng Huang, 2002. "Managing Chinese Bureaucrats: An Institutional Economics Perspective," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 50(1), pages 61-79, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:polstu:v:50:y:2002:i:1:p:61-79
    DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00359
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    Cited by:

    1. Tian, Zhihua & Hu, An & Chen, Yang & Shao, Shuai, 2023. "Local officials’ tenure and CO2 emissions in China," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 173(C).
    2. Chau, Nancy H. & Qin, Yu & Zhang, Weiwen, 2015. "Networked Leaders in the Shadow of the Market – A Chinese Experiment in Allocating Land Conversion Rights," Working Papers 250022, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
    3. Wang, Jiayi & Lei, Ping, 2021. "The tournament of Chinese environmental protection: Strong or weak competition?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 181(C).
    4. Kwan Nok Chan & Shiwei Fan, 2021. "Friction and bureaucratic control in authoritarian regimes," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 15(4), pages 1406-1418, October.
    5. Enikolopov, Ruben & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2007. "Decentralization and political institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(11-12), pages 2261-2290, December.
    6. Jun Zhang, 2008. "China's Economic Growth: Trajectories and Evolving Institutions," WIDER Working Paper Series RP2008-33, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    7. Xingheng Xie & Mengting Zhang & Changbiao Zhong, 2022. "Temporal and Spatial Variations in China’s Government-Official-Appointment System and Local Water-Environment Pollution," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(14), pages 1-17, July.
    8. Danqing Wang & Zhitao Zhu & Shuo Chen & Xiaowei Rose Luo, 2021. "Running out of steam? A political incentive perspective of FDI inflows in China," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 52(4), pages 692-717, June.
    9. Chau, Nancy H. & Qin, Yu & Zhang, Weiwen, 2016. "Leader Networks and Transaction Costs: A Chinese Experiment in Interjurisdictional Contracting," IZA Discussion Papers 9641, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    10. repec:aly:journl:202305 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Zhao, Renjie & Chen, Jie & Feng, Chen & Zhong, Shihu, 2020. "The impact of anti-corruption measures on land supply and the associated implications: The case of China," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    12. Lily Fang & Josh Lerner & Chaopeng Wu & Qi Zhang, 2018. "Corruption, Government Subsidies, and Innovation: Evidence from China," NBER Working Papers 25098, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Peiyao Shen & Regina Betz & Andreas Ortmann & Rukai Gong, 2020. "Improving Truthful Reporting of Polluting Firms by Rotating Inspectors: Experimental Evidence from a Bribery Game," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 76(2), pages 201-233, July.
    14. Li, Lixing, 2011. "The incentive role of creating "cities" in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 172-181, March.
    15. Alfred M Wu, 2019. "The logic of basic education provision and public goods preferences in Chinese fiscal federalism," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(12), pages 1-15, December.
    16. Wu, Mingqin & Chen, Bin, 2016. "Assignment of provincial officials based on economic performance: Evidence from China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 60-75.
    17. Helen Wei Hu & Pei Sun, 2019. "What determines the severity of tunneling in China?," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 161-184, March.
    18. Jiang, Junyan & Mei, Yuan, 2020. "Mandarins make markets: Leadership rotations and inter-provincial trade in China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(C).
    19. Liqiang Chen & Ming Gao, 2020. "The effects of three types of China's official turnover on air quality: A regression discontinuity study," Growth and Change, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 1081-1101, September.
    20. Zhang, Zhenbo & Wang, Jingwen, 2022. "Undermining or remodeling: Effects of leadership rotation on the effectiveness of authoritarian environmentalism in China," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    21. Dongjin Chen & Youxing Lang, 2021. "The cream‐skimming effect in China's health care services: A mixed methods study," International Journal of Health Planning and Management, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 113-133, January.

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