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Family bargaining over parental leave: A collective household model with endogenous gender power

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  • Ryo Sakamoto

Abstract

Although existing studies have suggested that men's leave‐taking positively affects children's development and their involvement in childcare and household chores in the long run, the underlying mechanism remains unclear. To shed light on this ambiguity, this study develops a dynamic collective household model and analyses household decisions on parental leave‐sharing between spouses, resource allocation, home production, and labour supply. We demonstrate that gender equality in bargaining positions within families before leave‐taking is crucial in explaining the positive impacts of men's leave‐taking. Specifically, if women's intrahousehold bargaining power before taking parental leave is sufficiently low, their husbands are unlikely to take leave, and women's positions may deteriorate after leave. Consequently, households may allocate fewer resources to children, and men may not actively participate in childcare and household chores. Our model suggests that implementing parental leave policies for both genders may not be sufficient; simultaneous measures to increase women's bargaining power are necessary to encourage men to take parental leave and maximize the policies' benefits.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryo Sakamoto, 2023. "Family bargaining over parental leave: A collective household model with endogenous gender power," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(5), pages 613-637, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:pacecr:v:28:y:2023:i:5:p:613-637
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0106.12437
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