Political connection, family involvement, and IPO underpricing: Evidence from the listed non‐state‐owned enterprises of China

Based on hand‐collected data on Chinese listed non‐state‐owned enterprises (hereafter, non‐SOEs), this paper investigates how political connection and family involvement affect firms' IPO underpricing. We find that political connection and family involvement, serving as common compensatory mechanisms for institutional deficiencies, can significantly alleviate the IPO underpricing of non‐SOEs. Moreover, evidence shows that in regions with a well‐developed institutional environment, political connection significantly reduces the degree of IPO underpricing. But for companies located in regions with a poorer institutional environment, family involvement helps to achieve lower underpricing. The effects also vary with firm size. Political connection significantly mitigates underpricing of large firms. But for small firms, only family involvement plays a significant role in lowering IPO underpricing. Finally, we find that instead of increasing the offering price, the effect works in another way. Non‐SOEs with political connection and family involvement are no longer growth firms, for which the influence of the regulatory bar set by the China Security Regulatory Committee (CSRC) decreases. These firms tend to experience poorer long‐term performance after the IPO. This may lead to a relatively lower price in the secondary market, resulting in a lower level of IPO underpricing.