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Value Congruence as a Source of Intrinsic Motivation

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  • Ting Ren

Abstract

Using a multisource dataset consisting of information from organizational survey and public database of nursing homes in a Midwestern state in the United States, the present study empirically investigates the relationships between employee‐organization value congruence, organizational delegation of decision‐making and monitoring in the workplace. The results show that value congruence between employees and the organization complements delegation of decision‐making, substitutes for monitoring, and further improves organizational performance, especially which of the relational dimension. These findings suggest that value congruence can serve as a source of intrinsic motivation for employee effort and mitigate agency problems in the workplace.

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  • Ting Ren, 2010. "Value Congruence as a Source of Intrinsic Motivation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 94-109, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:63:y:2010:i:1:p:94-109
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6435.2010.00462.x
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    2. Marco A. Barrenechea-Mendez & Avner Ben-Ner, 2017. "Mission Congruence and Organization Design: An Empirical Analysis of Childcare Facilities," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(3), pages 411-426, July.
    3. Hongdan Zhao & Yuanhua Chen & Weiwei Liu, 2023. "Socially Responsible Human Resource Management and Employee Moral Voice: Based on the Self-determination Theory," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 929-946, March.
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    7. Lea Sell & Bryan Cleal, 2011. "Job Satisfaction, Work Environment, and Rewards: Motivational Theory Revisited," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 25(1), pages 1-23, March.

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