IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jpbect/v2y2000i3p319-348.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Lobby Groups and the Financial Support of Election Campaigns

Author

Listed:
  • M. Socorro Puy

Abstract

We study a model of competition between two political parties with policy compromise. There is a special interest group with well‐defined preferences on political issues. Voters are of two kinds: impressionable and knowledgeable. The impressionable voters are influenced by the election campaigns. The objective of the parties is to obtain the maximum votes. Parties compete for financial support from a given interest group. Each party proposes a platform in exchange for an amount of campaign funds, and the interest group decides whether to accept or reject each of these proposals. We show that parties' competition resembles, to a certain extent, Bertrand competition. Furthermore, in equilibrium only one party gets funds from the interest group. This result differs from the one obtained in a similar model by Grossman and Helpman in which, in equilibrium, both parties are financed by the interest group. This difference arises because Grossman and Helpman assume that it is the interest group who makes the proposals to the political parties.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Socorro Puy, 2000. "Lobby Groups and the Financial Support of Election Campaigns," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 2(3), pages 319-348, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:2:y:2000:i:3:p:319-348
    DOI: 10.1111/1097-3923.00041
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1097-3923.00041
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1097-3923.00041?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:2:y:2000:i:3:p:319-348. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/apettea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.