IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jpbect/v13y2011i4p595-630.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Group Formation and Governance

Author

Listed:
  • LUDOVIC RENOU

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of the governance of a group, whether be it unanimity, simple majority or qualified majority, on its size, composition, and inclination to change the status quo. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that not only unanimity might favor the formation of larger groups than majority, but also a change of status quo. This paper therefore suggests that unanimity, often blamed for the European inertia of the last two decades, was only a scapegoat.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Ludovic Renou, 2011. "Group Formation and Governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(4), pages 595-630, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:13:y:2011:i:4:p:595-630
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Philippe Jehiel & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2001. "Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(2), pages 393-413.
    2. d'Aspremont, Claude & Jacquemin, Alexis, 1988. "Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 1133-1137, December.
    3. Mas-Colell,Andreu, 1990. "The Theory of General Economic Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521388702, September.
    4. Dennis Leech, 2002. "Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 109(1), pages 375-397, January.
    5. Levy, Gilat, 2004. "A model of political parties," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 250-277, April.
    6. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    7. Konishi, Hideo & Ray, Debraj, 2003. "Coalition formation as a dynamic process," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 1-41, May.
    8. Kamien, Morton I & Zang, Israel, 1993. "Competing Research Joint Ventures," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(1), pages 23-40, Spring.
    9. Volker Nocke, 1999. "Cartel Stability under Capacity Constraints: The Traditional View Restored," STICERD - Economics of Industry Papers 23, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    10. Giovanni Maggi & Massimo Morelli, 2006. "Self-Enforcing Voting in International Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 1137-1158, September.
    11. Holmstrom, Bengt & Myerson, Roger B, 1983. "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1799-1819, November.
    12. Debraj Ray & Rajiv Vohra, 2001. "Coalitional Power and Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(6), pages 1355-1384, December.
    13. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Voting Power In The Governance Of The International Monetary Fund," Economic Research Papers 269354, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    14. repec:adr:anecst:y:1997:i:45:p:09 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January.
    16. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
    17. Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(1), pages 85-114.
    18. Salvador Barbera & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(3), pages 1011-1048.
    19. Philippe Jehiel & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1997. "Free Mobility and the Optimal Number of Jurisdictions," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 45, pages 219-231.
    20. Martin J. Osborne & Rabee Tourky, 2008. "Party Formation in Single-Issue Politics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(5), pages 974-1005, September.
    21. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    22. Casella, Alessandra, 1992. "On Markets and Clubs: Economic and Political Integration of Regions with Unequal Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 115-121, May.
    23. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1994. "Comparing Equilibria," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 441-459, June.
    24. Garance Genicot & Debraj Ray, 2003. "Group Formation in Risk-Sharing Arrangements," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(1), pages 87-113.
    25. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    26. repec:bla:jemstr:v:2:y:1993:i:1:p:23-40:a is not listed on IDEAS
    27. Reinhard Selten, 1973. "A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 008, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    28. Keith Hartley & Todd Sandler, 2001. "Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(3), pages 869-896, September.
    29. Kohler, Marion, 2002. "Coalition formation in international monetary policy games," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 371-385, March.
    30. Leech, D., 2000. "Members' Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 583, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2021. "Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 70-111, August.
    2. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September.
    3. De Fraja, Gianni & Sákovics, József, 2012. "Exclusive nightclubs and lonely hearts columns: Non-monotone participation in optional intermediation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 618-632.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. László Á. Kóczy, 2018. "Partition Function Form Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, number 978-3-319-69841-0, December.
    2. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 2015. "Coalition Formation," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
    3. Bloch, Francis & Gomes, Armando, 2006. "Contracting with externalities and outside options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 172-201, March.
    4. Le Breton, Michel & Lepelley, Dominique & Macé, Antonin & Merlin, Vincent, 2017. "Le mécanisme optimal de vote au sein du conseil des représentants d’un système fédéral," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 93(1-2), pages 203-248, Mars-Juin.
    5. Pavel Doležel, 2011. "Optimizing the Efficiency of Weighted Voting Games," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 306-323, November.
    6. Thoron, Sylvie, 2004. "Which acceptable agreements are equilibria?," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 111-134, January.
    7. Leech, Dennis, 2003. "The Utility of the Voting Power Approach," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 678, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    8. Abraham Diskin & Moshe Koppel, 2010. "Voting power: an information theory approach," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(1), pages 105-119, January.
    9. Maria Montero, 2023. "Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 525-548, June.
    10. Daron Acemoglu & Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2006. "Coalition Formation in Political Games," Working Papers w0090, New Economic School (NES).
    11. Takaaki Abe, 2021. "Cartel Formation in Cournot Competition with Asymmetric Costs: A Partition Function Approach," Games, MDPI, vol. 12(1), pages 1-16, February.
    12. Dongryul Lee & Pilwon Kim, 2022. "Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 39-68, January.
    13. Jon Eguia, 2012. "A spatial theory of party formation," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(3), pages 549-570, April.
    14. Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 111-135, September.
    15. Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael & Mallozzi, Lina, 2011. "A New Class of Welfare Maximizing Stable Sharing Rules for Partition Function Games with Externalities," Working Papers 2011/08, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
    16. Leech, Dennis & Leech, Robert, 2009. "Reforming IMF and World Bank governance : in search of simplicity, transparency and democratic legitimacy in the voting rules," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 914, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    17. Thoron, Sylvie & Sol, Emmanuel & Willinger, Marc, 2009. "Do binding agreements solve the social dilemma?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1271-1282, December.
    18. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2003. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2028, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    19. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2008. "Political careers or career politicians?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 597-608, April.
    20. Ahmed Mahmud, 2011. "The creation of multi-ethnic nations with or without a core region," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(3), pages 359-376, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:13:y:2011:i:4:p:595-630. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/apettea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.