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Ludovic Renou

Personal Details

First Name:Ludovic
Middle Name:
Last Name:Renou
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pre3
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://lrenou-econ.github.io/website/
Terminal Degree:2003 Department of Economics; European University Institute (from RePEc Genealogy)

Affiliation

School of Economics and Finance
Queen Mary University of London

London, United Kingdom
http://www.econ.qmul.ac.uk/
RePEc:edi:deqmwuk (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Ralph-C Bayer & Subir Bose & Matthew Polisson & Ludovic Renou, 2013. "Ambiguity Revealed," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  2. Ralph-C. Bayer & Ludovic Renou, 2011. "Cognitive abilities and behavior in strategic-form games.," Discussion Papers in Economics 11/16, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
  3. Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," HEC Research Papers Series 926, HEC Paris.
  4. Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/10, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Jan 2010.
  5. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2009. "Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/24, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
  6. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2009. "From Ordients to Optimization: Substitution Effects without Differentiability," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/6, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
  7. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2008. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/2, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Apr 2008.
  8. Ludovic Renou & Ralph C. Bayer, 2008. "Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus at the Laboratory," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/16, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Nov 2008.
  9. Ludovic Renou, 2007. "Group formation and governance," Discussion Papers in Economics 07/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
  10. Ludovic Renou, 2006. "Partnerships," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2006-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  11. Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2006. "Bilateral Commitment," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2006-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  12. Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "More Strategies, More Nash Equilibria," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2005-01, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  13. Ludovic Renou, 2005. "Supermodular Social Games," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2005-02, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  14. Guillaume Carlier & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "Debt Contracts with ex-ante and ex-post Asymmetric Information: An Example," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2005-03, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
  15. Ludovic RENOU, 2003. "Beliefs about Beliefs and Endogenous Formation of a Multi-lender Coalition in a Costly State Verification Model," Economics Working Papers ECO2003/21, European University Institute.
  16. Renou, Ludovic & Guillaume Carlier, 2003. "Optimal debt contracts and diversity of opinions: an extreme case of bunching," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2003 172, Royal Economic Society.

Articles

  1. , & ,, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
  2. Ludovic Renou, 2011. "Group Formation and Governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(4), pages 595-630, August.
  3. Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2011. "Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 527-533, March.
  4. Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2010. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 264-286, January.
  5. Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Bilateral commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1817-1831, July.
  6. Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 488-505, May.
  7. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September.
  8. Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic, 2007. "More strategies, more Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 551-557, July.
  9. G. Carlier & L. Renou, 2006. "Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 461-473, June.
  10. Guillaume Carlier & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 497-504, February.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Ralph-C Bayer & Subir Bose & Matthew Polisson & Ludovic Renou, 2013. "Ambiguity Revealed," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2013-05, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Cited by:

    1. Aluma Dembo & Shachar Kariv & Matthew Polisson & John Quah, 2021. "Ever since Allais," IFS Working Papers W21/15, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    2. Polisson, Matthew & Renou, Ludovic, 2016. "Afriat’s Theorem and Samuelson’s ‘Eternal Darkness’," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 36-40.
    3. Matthew Polisson & John K.-H. Quah, 2013. "Revealed preference tests under risk and uncertainty," Discussion Papers in Economics 13/24, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.

  2. Ralph-C. Bayer & Ludovic Renou, 2011. "Cognitive abilities and behavior in strategic-form games.," Discussion Papers in Economics 11/16, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.

    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Chia-Ching & Chiu, I-Ming & Smith, John & Yamada, Tetsuji, 2012. "Too smart to be selfish? Measures of cognitive ability, social preferences, and consistency," MPRA Paper 41078, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Allred, Sarah & Duffy, Sean & Smith, John, 2016. "Cognitive load and strategic sophistication," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 162-178.
    3. Duffy, Sean & Smith, John, 2012. "Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game," MPRA Paper 35906, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Sean Duffy & J. J. Naddeo & David Owens & John Smith, 2024. "Cognitive Load and Mixed Strategies: On Brains and Minimax," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 26(03), pages 1-34, September.
    5. Kiss, H.J. & Rodriguez-Lara, I. & Rosa-García, A., 2016. "Think twice before running! Bank runs and cognitive abilities," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 12-19.
    6. Choo, Lawrence & Zhou, Xiaoyu, 2019. "Can market competition reduce anomalous behaviours," FAU Discussion Papers in Economics 08/2019, Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, Institute for Economics.
    7. Despoina Alempaki & Andrew M Colman & Felix Koelle & Graham Loomes & Briony D Pulford, 2019. "Investigating the failure to best respond in experimental games," Discussion Papers 2019-13, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    8. Duffy, Sean & Smith, John, 2014. "Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game: Are there brains in games?," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 47-56.
    9. Gill, David & Prowse, Victoria, 2012. "Cognitive ability and learning to play equilibrium: A level-k analysis," MPRA Paper 38317, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 23 Apr 2012.
    10. Bayer, Ralph C. & Renou, Ludovic, 2016. "Logical omniscience at the laboratory," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 41-49.
    11. Chatterjee, Sidharta, 2011. "The Neuroeconomics of Learning and Information Processing; Applying Markov Decision Process," MPRA Paper 28883, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Chen, Chia-Ching & Chiu, I-Ming & Smith, John & Yamada, Tetsuji, 2011. "Too smart to be selfish? Measures of intelligence, social preferences, and consistency," MPRA Paper 34438, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Juan M. Benito-Ostolaza & Penélope Hernández & Juan A. Sanchis-Llopis, 2015. "Are individuals with higher cognitive ability expected to play more strategically?," Working Papers 1507, Department of Applied Economics II, Universidad de Valencia.

  3. Tomala, Tristan & Renou, Ludovic, 2010. "Mechanism design and communication networks," HEC Research Papers Series 926, HEC Paris.

    Cited by:

    1. Mohamed Belhaj & Sebastian Bervoets & Frédéric Deroïan, 2013. "Network Design under Local Complementarities," AMSE Working Papers 1309, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France, revised 12 Feb 2013.
    2. Larionov, Daniil & Pham, Hien & Yamashita, Takuro & Zhu, Shuguang, 2021. "First Best Implementation with Costly Information Acquisition," TSE Working Papers 21-1261, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Apr 2022.
    3. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2020. "Robust communication on networks," Papers 2007.00457, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2020.
    4. Rivera, Thomas J., 2018. "Incentives and the structure of communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 201-247.
    5. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristián, 2013. "A folk theorem for competing mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(3), pages 953-973.
    6. Rene Saran & Norovsambuu Tumennasan, 2015. "Implementation by Sortition in Nonexclusive Information Economies," Economics Working Papers 2015-13, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    7. Zhu, Shuguang, 2023. "Private disclosure with multiple agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 212(C).
    8. Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
    9. Renault, Jérôme & Renou, Ludovic & Tomala, Tristan, 2014. "Secure message transmission on directed networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 1-18.
    10. Laclau, Marie & Renou, Ludovic & Venel, Xavier, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    11. Marie Laclau & Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Communication on networks and strong reliability," Working Papers hal-03099678, HAL.

  4. Claudio Mezzetti & Ludovic Renou, 2009. "Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/10, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Jan 2010.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris, 2009. "Rationalizable Implementation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1697, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2009. "Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/24, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    3. Takashi Kunimoto & Roberto Serrano, 2016. "Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences," Working Papers 2016-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    4. Jain, Ritesh, 2021. "Rationalizable implementation of social choice correspondences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 47-66.
    5. Takahashi, Satoru & Tercieux, Olivier, 2020. "Robust equilibrium outcomes in sequential games under almost common certainty of payoffs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    6. Ville Korpela & Michele Lombardi & Hannu Vartiainen, 2021. "Implementation with farsighted agents," Discussion Papers 140, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    7. Jean-François Laslier & Matias Nunez & M. Remzi Sanver, 2021. "A solution to the two-person implementation problem," Post-Print hal-03498370, HAL.
    8. Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Nash implementation by stochastic mechanisms: a simple full characterization," Papers 2211.05431, arXiv.org.
    9. Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2009. "Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: A Unified Approach to Exact and Approximate Implementation," Working Papers wp2009_0908, CEMFI.
    10. Saran, Rene, 2016. "Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 517-564.
    11. Peralta, Esteban, 2019. "Bayesian implementation with verifiable information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 65-72.
    12. Kunimoto, Takashi & Saran, Rene & Serrano, Roberto, 2020. "Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions," Economics and Statistics Working Papers 21-2020, Singapore Management University, School of Economics.
    13. Jain, Ritesh & Lombardi, Michele, 2022. "Continuous virtual implementation: Complete information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 99(C).
    14. Yi-Chun Chen & Takashi Kunimoto & Yifei Sun & Siyang Xiong, 2021. "Maskin Meets Abreu and Matsushima," Papers 2110.06551, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2022.
    15. Korpela, Ville & Lombardi, Michele & Vartiainen, Hannu, 2021. "Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 202-212.
    16. Jianxin Yi, 2021. "Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(2), pages 279-288, September.
    17. Ritesh Jain & Michele Lombardi, 2019. "Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms: Complete information," IEAS Working Paper : academic research 19-A001, Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan.
    18. Mezzetti, Claudio & Renou, Ludovic, 2017. "Repeated Nash implementation," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.

  5. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2009. "Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/24, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.

    Cited by:

    1. Stoye, Jörg, 2011. "Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2226-2251.
    2. Schlag, Karl, 2018. "How to Play Out of Equilibrium: Beating the Average," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181525, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    3. Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2013. "The Minimum Approval Mechanism Implements the Efficient Public Good Allocation Theoretically and Experimentally," ISER Discussion Paper 08874r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Sep 2013.
    4. Koffi Serge William Yao & Emmanuelle Lavaine & Marc Willinger, 2021. "Effectiveness of the approval mechanism for CPR dilemmas: unanimity versus majority rule," Working Papers hal-03234786, HAL.
    5. Bernhard Kasberger & Karl H. Schlag, 2024. "Robust Bidding in First-Price Auctions: How to Bid Without Knowing What Others Are Doing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 70(7), pages 4219-4235, July.
    6. Yingni Guo & Eran Shmaya, 2019. "Robust Monopoly Regulation," Papers 1910.04260, arXiv.org.
    7. Felix Bierbrauer & Nick Netzer, 2012. "Mechanism design and intentions," ECON - Working Papers 066, Department of Economics - University of Zurich, revised Apr 2014.
    8. Yao, Koffi Serge William & Lavaine, Emmanuelle & Willinger, Marc, 2024. "Effectiveness of the approval mechanism in a three-player common pool resource dilemma," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
    9. Saran, Rene, 2016. "Bounded depths of rationality and implementation with complete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 517-564.
    10. Wanchang Zhang, 2022. "Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors," Papers 2204.13726, arXiv.org.
    11. Malachy James Gavan & Antonio Penta, 2022. "Safe Implementation," Working Papers 1363, Barcelona School of Economics.
    12. George F. N. Shoukry, 2019. "Outcome-robust mechanisms for Nash implementation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(3), pages 497-526, March.
    13. Gavan, Malachy James & Penta, Antonio, 2022. "Safe Implementation," TSE Working Papers 22-1369, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    14. Xiaochuan Huang & Takehito Masuda & Yoshitaka Okano & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2016. "Cooperation among behaviorally heterogeneous players in social dilemma with stay of leave decisions," KIER Working Papers 944, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    15. Stauber, Ronald, 2017. "Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 409-432.

  6. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2008. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/2, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Apr 2008.

    Cited by:

    1. Stoye, Jörg, 2011. "Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2226-2251.
    2. Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2010. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 264-286, January.
    3. Duffy, John & Ralston, Jason, 2020. "Innovate versus imitate: Theory and experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 177(C), pages 727-751.
    4. Gisèle Umbhauer, 2021. "Minimax regret in the 11-20 money request game," Working Papers of BETA 2021-48, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    5. Ludovic Renou & Karl H. Schlag, 2009. "Implementation in Minimax Regret Equilibrium," Discussion Papers in Economics 09/24, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    6. Bergemann, Dirk & Schlag, Karl, 2011. "Robust monopoly pricing," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2527-2543.
    7. Degan, Arianna & Li, Ming, 2015. "Psychologically-based voting with uncertainty," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 242-259.
    8. Philippe Bich, 2016. "Prudent Equilibria and Strategic Uncertainty in Discontinuous Games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01337293, HAL.
    9. Karl Schlag & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2020. "Compromise, Don't Optimize: Generalizing Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium to Allow for Ambiguity," Papers 2003.02539, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2021.
    10. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu & Yamamori, Tetsuo, 2023. "Asymmetric volunteer's dilemma game: Theory and experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 955-977.
    11. García-Pola, Bernardo, 2020. "Do people minimize regret in strategic situations? A level-k comparison," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 82-104.
    12. Bich, Philippe, 2019. "Strategic uncertainty and equilibrium selection in discontinuous games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 786-822.
    13. Gisèle Umbhauer, 2022. "Market Exit and Minimax Regret," Post-Print hal-04491262, HAL.
    14. Gisèle Umbhauer, 2020. "Market exit and minimax regret," Working Papers of BETA 2020-29, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    15. Bernhard Kasberger, 2022. "An Equilibrium Model of the First-Price Auction with Strategic Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics," Papers 2202.07517, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2022.
    16. Yang, Kai Hao, 2021. "Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
    17. Paolo Galeazzi & Johannes Marti, 2023. "Choice Structures in Games," Papers 2304.11575, arXiv.org.
    18. Kasberger, Bernhard & Woodward, Kyle, 2021. "Bidding in Multi-Unit Auctions under Limited Information," MPRA Paper 111185, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Sabino, Emerson Rodrigues & Rêgo, Leandro Chaves, 2024. "Minimax regret stability in the graph model for conflict resolution," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 314(3), pages 1087-1097.
    20. Galeazzi, Paolo & Marti, Johannes, 2023. "Choice structures in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 431-455.
    21. Iverson, Terrence, 2013. "Minimax regret discounting," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 598-608.
    22. Philippe Bich, 2016. "Prudent Equilibria and Strategic Uncertainty in Discontinuous Games," Working Papers halshs-01337293, HAL.
    23. He, Simin & Zhu, Xun, 2023. "Real-time monitoring in a public-goods game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 454-479.
    24. Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pass, Rafael, 2012. "Iterated regret minimization: A new solution concept," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 184-207.
    25. Rumen Kostadinov, 2023. "Worst-case Regret in Ambiguous Dynamic Games," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-08, McMaster University.
    26. Stauber, Ronald, 2017. "Irrationality and ambiguity in extensive games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 409-432.
    27. Carmen Beviá & Luis Corchón, 2022. "Contests with dominant strategies," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 74(4), pages 1-19, November.
    28. Mass, Helene, 2018. "Strategies under strategic uncertainty," ZEW Discussion Papers 18-055, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    29. Ronald Stauber, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2019-668, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    30. Valerio Capraro & Joseph Y Halpern, 2019. "Translucent players: Explaining cooperative behavior in social dilemmas," Rationality and Society, , vol. 31(4), pages 371-408, November.
    31. Stauber, Ronald, 2019. "A strategic product for belief functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 38-64.

  7. Ludovic Renou & Ralph C. Bayer, 2008. "Homo Sapiens Sapiens Meets Homo Strategicus at the Laboratory," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/16, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester, revised Nov 2008.

    Cited by:

    1. Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2010. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 264-286, January.
    2. Ralph-C Bayer, 2006. "Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Competition," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2006-06, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

  8. Ludovic Renou, 2007. "Group formation and governance," Discussion Papers in Economics 07/07, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.

    Cited by:

    1. Antonin Macé & Rafael Treibich, 2021. "Inducing Cooperation through Weighted Voting and Veto Power," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03342906, HAL.
    2. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September.
    3. De Fraja, Gianni & Sákovics, József, 2012. "Exclusive nightclubs and lonely hearts columns: Non-monotone participation in optional intermediation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 618-632.

  9. Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2006. "Bilateral Commitment," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2006-07, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Cited by:

    1. Dutta, Rohan & Ishii, Ryosuke, 2016. "Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 699-727.
    2. Nie, Pu-yan, 2013. "Duopoly quality commitment," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 832-842.
    3. Frédéric Koessler & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2013. "Committing to transparency to resist corruption," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754616, HAL.
    4. Miettinen, Topi & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining," SITE Working Paper Series 8, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
    5. Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2016. "Rule Rationality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 997-1026, August.
    6. Joseph Y. Halpern & Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2022. "The Benefits of Coarse Preferences," Papers 2201.10141, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    7. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers 201612, CERDI.
    8. Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 488-505, May.
    9. Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2013. "Efficiency in strategic form games: A little trust can go a long way," Discussion Papers 13/19, Department of Economics, University of York.
    10. Rohan Dutta & Ryosuke Ishii, 2013. "Coordinating by Not Committing : Efficiency as the Unique Outcome," Cahiers de recherche 10-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    11. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William, 2009. "Endogenous games and equilibrium adoption of social norms and ethical constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 761-774, July.
    12. Tigran Melkonyan & Surajeet Chakravarty, 2024. "Pre‐play promises, threats and commitments under partial credibility," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(1), pages 308-328, January.
    13. Pei, Harry Di, 2016. "When does restricting your opponent's freedom hurt you?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 234-239.

  10. Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "More Strategies, More Nash Equilibria," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2005-01, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Cited by:

    1. Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer, 2012. "Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 565-584, June.
    2. Klaus Kultti & Hannu Salonen & Hannu Vartiainen, 2011. "Distribution of pure Nash equilibria in n-person games with random best replies," Discussion Papers 71, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    3. Olivier Gossner, 2010. "Ability and Knowledge," Post-Print halshs-00754449, HAL.
    4. Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Bilateral Commitment," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/20, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    5. Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer, 2005. "The Making of International Environmental Agreements," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 652.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).

  11. Guillaume Carlier & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "Debt Contracts with ex-ante and ex-post Asymmetric Information: An Example," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2005-03, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.

    Cited by:

    1. Hans Hvide & Tore Leite, 2010. "Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(1), pages 149-165, July.
    2. Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2007. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    3. John Knight & Sai Ding and Alessandra Guariglia, 2010. "Negative investment in China: financing constraints and restructuring versus growth," Economics Series Working Papers 519, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Stefan Krasa & Tridib Sharma & Anne Villamil, 2008. "Bankruptcy and firm finance," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 239-266, August.
    5. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September.
    6. Aivazian, Varouj & Gu, Xinhua & Qiu, Jiaping & Huang, Bihong, 2015. "Loan collateral, corporate investment, and business cycle," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 380-392.
    7. Marie-Louise Viero, 2006. "Contracting In Vague Environments," Working Paper 1106, Economics Department, Queen's University.

Articles

  1. , & ,, 2012. "Mechanism design and communication networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Ludovic Renou, 2011. "Group Formation and Governance," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 13(4), pages 595-630, August.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2011. "Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 527-533, March.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Renou, Ludovic & Schlag, Karl H., 2010. "Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 264-286, January.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  5. Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Bilateral commitment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(4), pages 1817-1831, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  6. Renou, Ludovic, 2009. "Commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 488-505, May.

    Cited by:

    1. Wolpert David & Jamison Julian & Newth David & Harre Michael, 2011. "Strategic Choice of Preferences: the Persona Model," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-39, August.
    2. Dutta, Rohan & Ishii, Ryosuke, 2016. "Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 163(C), pages 699-727.
    3. Frédéric Koessler & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky, 2013. "Committing to transparency to resist corruption," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-00754616, HAL.
    4. Miettinen, Topi & Perea, Andrés, 2009. "Commitment in Alternating Offers Bargaining," SITE Working Paper Series 8, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics.
    5. Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2016. "Rule Rationality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 57(3), pages 997-1026, August.
    6. Sophie Bade & Guillaume Haeringer & Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Bilateral Commitment," Discussion Papers in Economics 08/20, Division of Economics, School of Business, University of Leicester.
    7. James W. Bono & David H. Wolpert, 2009. "Game Mining: How to Make Money from those about to Play a Game," Working Papers 2009-10, American University, Department of Economics.
    8. Joseph Y. Halpern & Yuval Heller & Eyal Winter, 2022. "The Benefits of Coarse Preferences," Papers 2201.10141, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2023.
    9. Babajanyan, S.G. & Melkikh, A.V. & Allahverdyan, A.E., 2020. "Leadership scenarios in prisoner’s dilemma game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 545(C).
    10. Grégoire ROTA-GRAZIOSI, 2016. "Implementing Tax Coordination and Harmonization through Voluntary Commitment," Working Papers 201612, CERDI.
    11. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov & Tennenholtz, Moshe, 2017. "Sequential commitment games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 297-315.
    12. Miyahara, Yasuyuki & Sekiguchi, Tadashi, 2013. "Finitely repeated games with monitoring options," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 1929-1952.
    13. Rohan Dutta & Ryosuke Ishii, 2013. "Coordinating by Not Committing : Efficiency as the Unique Outcome," Cahiers de recherche 10-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    14. James W. Bono & David H. Wolpert, 2014. "Game Mining: How to Make Money from those about to Play a Game," Advances in Austrian Economics, in: Entangled Political Economy, volume 18, pages 179-211, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    15. Ignacio García-Jurado & Natividad Llorca & Ana Meca & Manuel Pulido & Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, 2009. "Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 17(1), pages 85-95, July.
    16. Tigran Melkonyan & Surajeet Chakravarty, 2024. "Pre‐play promises, threats and commitments under partial credibility," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 62(1), pages 308-328, January.
    17. Arina Nikandrova, 2013. "Repeated Play of Families of Games by Resource-Constrained Players," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-8, July.
    18. Pei, Harry Di, 2016. "When does restricting your opponent's freedom hurt you?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 234-239.

  7. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Steffen Brenner, 2009. "Optimal formation rules for patent pools," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(3), pages 373-388, September.
    2. Jain, N. & Imai, S., 2015. "Dynamic Costly State Verification with Repeated Loans: a two-period analysis," Working Papers 13889, Department of Economics, City University London.

  8. Bade, Sophie & Haeringer, Guillaume & Renou, Ludovic, 2007. "More strategies, more Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 551-557, July.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  9. G. Carlier & L. Renou, 2006. "Debt contracts with ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric information: an example," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(2), pages 461-473, June.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  10. Guillaume Carlier & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "A costly state verification model with diversity of opinions," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 25(2), pages 497-504, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Hans Hvide & Tore Leite, 2010. "Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 44(1), pages 149-165, July.
    2. Allen N. Berger & Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & W. Scott Frame & Nathan H. Miller, 2007. "Why do borrowers pledge collateral? new empirical evidence on the role of asymmetric information," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2006-29, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    3. Stefan Krasa & Tridib Sharma & Anne Villamil, 2008. "Bankruptcy and firm finance," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(2), pages 239-266, August.
    4. Carsten Krabbe Nielsen, 2009. "The Loan Contract with Costly State Verification and Subjective Beliefs," Discussion Paper Series 0918, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
    5. Ludovic Renou, 2008. "Multi-lender coalitions in costly state verification models," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 36(3), pages 407-433, September.
    6. Guillaume Carlier & Ludovic Renou, 2005. "Debt Contracts with ex-ante and ex-post Asymmetric Information: An Example," School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers 2005-03, University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy.
    7. Krasa, Stefan & Sharma, Tridib & Villamil, Anne P., 2005. "Debt contracts and cooperative improvements," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(7), pages 857-874, November.
    8. Annamaria Menichini & Peter Simmons, 2008. "Sorting the Good Guys from Bad: On the Optimality of Deterministic Audit with Ex-Ante Information Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 201, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 27 Oct 2012.
    9. Marie-Louise Viero, 2006. "Contracting In Vague Environments," Working Paper 1106, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    10. Ludovic Renou & Guillaume Carlier, 2003. "Existence and monotonicity of optimal debt contracts in costly state verification models," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 7(5), pages 1-9.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 16 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (11) 2005-04-16 2005-04-16 2006-05-13 2006-07-21 2008-01-12 2008-05-10 2008-07-05 2008-10-07 2009-05-16 2010-03-28 2011-01-30. Author is listed
  2. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (3) 2007-06-23 2008-04-29 2009-05-16
  3. NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (3) 2008-01-12 2008-04-29 2008-05-10
  4. NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (2) 2008-04-29 2011-01-30
  5. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (2) 2008-10-07 2010-03-28
  6. NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (2) 2008-04-29 2011-01-30
  7. NEP-NET: Network Economics (2) 2008-10-07 2010-03-28
  8. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (2) 2006-05-13 2006-07-21
  9. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (1) 2006-05-13
  10. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 2003-06-16
  11. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2011-01-30
  12. NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (1) 2008-04-29
  13. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy (1) 2008-04-29
  14. NEP-MFD: Microfinance (1) 2003-11-03
  15. NEP-NEU: Neuroeconomics (1) 2011-01-30
  16. NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (1) 2007-06-23

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