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Strategic Information Disclosure And Competition For An Imperfectly Protected Innovation

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  • JOS JANSEN

Abstract

The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free‐rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business‐stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms' profits and the probability of innovation.

Suggested Citation

  • Jos Jansen, 2010. "Strategic Information Disclosure And Competition For An Imperfectly Protected Innovation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(2), pages 349-372, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:58:y:2010:i:2:p:349-372
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00417.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    4. Dan Kovenock & Florian Morath & Johannes Münster, 2015. "Information Sharing in Contests," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 570-596, September.
    5. Cho, Myeonghwan & Jun, Byung-hill, 2013. "Information sharing with competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 81-84.
    6. Farok J Contractor, 2019. "Can a firm find the balance between openness and secrecy? Towards a theory of an optimum level of disclosure," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 50(2), pages 261-274, March.
    7. Michelle Y. Lu & Jiwoong Shin, 2018. "A Model of Two-Sided Costly Communication for Building New Product Category Demand," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 37(3), pages 382-402, May.
    8. Ron N. Borkovsky, 2017. "The timing of version releases: A dynamic duopoly model," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 187-239, September.

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