Division of Labor in Teams
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DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00403.x
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References listed on IDEAS
- Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
- Landes, David S., 1986. "What Do Bosses Really Do?," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(3), pages 585-623, September.
- Joel S. Demski & David E.M. Sappington, 1991. "Resolving Double Moral Hazard Problems with Buyout Agreements," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 232-240, Summer.
- George J. Stigler, 1951. "The Division of Labor is Limited by the Extent of the Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 185-185.
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Cited by:
- Yoshio Kamijo & Daisuke Nakama, 2023. "Designing division of labor with strategic uncertainty within organizations: Model analysis and a behavioral experiment," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(2), pages 257-272, April.
- Eva-Maria Steiger & Ro'i Zultan, 2011.
"See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams,"
Jena Economics Research Papers
2011-040, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Roi Zultan & Eva-Maria Steiger, 2011. "See No Evil: Information Chains and Reciprocity in Teams," Working Papers 1108, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
- Steiger, Eva-Maria & Zultan, Ro'i, 2014. "See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 1-12.
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