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A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice

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  • Okumura, Yasunori

Abstract

We consider a situation where a student–school matching has already been temporarily decided, but unexpectedly the quotas of some schools are increased and/or some new schools enter. Furthermore, the school priority orders are allowed to be weak. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm to derive a student optimal stable matching under the profile of increased quotas that Pareto dominates the stable matching under that of initial quotas.

Suggested Citation

  • Okumura, Yasunori, 2016. "A stable and Pareto efficient update of matching in school choice," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 111-113.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:143:y:2016:i:c:p:111-113
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Yasunori Okumura, 2019. "School Choice with General Constraints: A Market Design Approach for the Nursery School Waiting List Problem in Japan," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 497-516, December.
    2. Minoru Kitahara & Yasunori Okumura, 2023. "On extensions of partial priorities in school choice," Papers 2305.00641, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2023.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Matching; Market design; School choice; Polynomial-time algorithm;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education

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