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The Effectiveness of Antidumping Measures: Some Evidence for Farmed Atlantic Salmon

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  • Henry W. Kinnucan
  • Øystein Myrland

Abstract

Counterfactual simulations of a partial equilibrium model of the world salmon market suggest safeguard tariffs imposed by the European Commission on salmon imports from Norway, Chile, and the Faroe Islands would do more to punish producers in the named exporting countries than to reward United Kingdom producers. The reason is that export supply is less elastic than import demand on a bilateral basis, which means that most of the tariff's incidence is borne by the targeted producers rather than EU consumers. The incidence problem is exacerbated by the feed quota (now biomass limit) that Norway uses to limit its production. A marketing fee that expands market demand is shown to be less distortionary than its tariff equivalent, and thus may be preferred from a second‐best perspective.

Suggested Citation

  • Henry W. Kinnucan & Øystein Myrland, 2006. "The Effectiveness of Antidumping Measures: Some Evidence for Farmed Atlantic Salmon," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(3), pages 459-477, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jageco:v:57:y:2006:i:3:p:459-477
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1477-9552.2006.00060.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sykes, Alan O., 2003. "The safeguards mess: a critique of WTO jurisprudence," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 2(3), pages 261-295, November.
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    2. Mulazzani, Luca & Malorgio, Giulio, 2015. "Is there coherence in the European Union’s strategy to guarantee the supply of fish products from abroad?," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 1-10.
    3. Zhang, Dengjun & Asche, Frank & Oglend, Atle, 2014. "Ethanol and trade: An analysis of price transmission in the US market," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1-8.
    4. Rausser, Gordon & Hamilton, Stephen & Kovach, Marty & Stifter, Ryan, 2009. "Unintended consequences: The spillover effects of common property regulations," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 24-39, January.
    5. Williams, Gary W. & Capps, Jr., Oral, 2022. "The apparent conflict of Norwegian pelagic fisheries management and Norwegian seafood council export promotion," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 25(3), February.
    6. Jones, Keithly & Harvey, David J. & Hahn, William & Muhammad, Andrew, 2008. "U.S. Demand for Source–Differentiated Shrimp: A Differential Approach," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 40(2), pages 609-621, August.
    7. Williams, Gary W. & Capps Jr., Oral, 2020. "Generic promotion of Norwegian seafood exports," International Food and Agribusiness Management Review, International Food and Agribusiness Management Association, vol. 23(3), August.
    8. Ashley Beeler & K. Aleks Schaefer & Jacob Sestak & Glenn Conover, 2024. "Impacts of U.S. countervailing duties on phosphate fertilizers," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 106(2), pages 620-636, March.

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