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"Loans for Shares" Revisited

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  • Daniel Treisman

Abstract

The "loans for shares" scheme of 1995-6--in which a handful of well-connected businessmen bought stakes in major Russian companies--is widely considered a scandal that slowed subsequent Russian economic growth. Fifteen years later, I reexamine the details of the program. In light of evidence available today, I concur with the critics that the scheme's execution appeared corrupt. However, in most other regards the conventional wisdom was wrong. The stakes involved represented a small fraction of the market; the pricing in most cases was in line with international practice; and the scheme can only explain a small part of Russia's increasing wealth inequality. The biggest beneficiaries were not the so-called "oligarchs," but Soviet era industrial managers. After the oligarchs consolidated control, their firms performed far better than comparable state enterprises and companies sold to incumbent managers, and helped fuel Russia's rapid growth after 1999.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Treisman, 2010. ""Loans for Shares" Revisited," NBER Working Papers 15819, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15819
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    2. Gerard Roland, 2018. "The evolution of post‐communist systems : Eastern Europe vs. China," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 26(4), pages 589-614, October.
    3. Fatih Kaplan & Ayşe E. Ünal, 2020. "Industrial Production Index - Crude Oil Price Nexus: Russia, Kazakhstan And Azerbaijan," Economic Annals, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Belgrade, vol. 65(227), pages 119-142, October –.
    4. John Hamilton & Simon Deakin, 2015. "Russia's Legal Transitions: Marxist Theory, Neoclassical Economics and the Rule of Law," Working Papers wp471, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    5. Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, 2019. "Power, ideas and culture in the ‘longue durée’ of institutional evolution: theory and application on the revolutions of property rights in Russia," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(5), pages 1483-1506, November.
    6. Boettke, Peter J. & Candela, Rosolino A. & Zhukov, Konstantin, 2023. "The morality of illicit markets: “Greasing the wheels” or “greasing the palm”?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 209(C), pages 411-422.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
    • P2 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P31 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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