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Insurance and Monopoly Power in a Mixed Private/Public Hospital System

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  • DONALD J. WRIGHT

Abstract

Consumers, when ill, often have the choice of being treated for free in a public hospital or at a positive price in a private hospital. To compensate for the positive price, private hospitals offer a higher quality treatment. Private hospitals and doctors also have a degree of monopoly power in their pricing. In this setting, it is shown that the introduction of an insurance premium subsidy does not affect the number of consumers treated in the private hospital, rather the private hospital and the doctor respond to the subsidy by increasing the prices they charge and the quality of the private hospital experience.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald J. Wright, 2006. "Insurance and Monopoly Power in a Mixed Private/Public Hospital System," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 82(259), pages 460-468, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecorec:v:82:y:2006:i:259:p:460-468
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4932.2006.00359.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vaithianathan, Rhema, 2006. "Health insurance and imperfect competition in the health care market," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1193-1202, November.
    2. Chiu, W. Henry, 1997. "Health insurance and the welfare of health care consumers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 125-133, April.
    3. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
    4. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, 2000. "Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health Care Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 992-1005, October.
    5. Rhema Vaithianathan, 2002. "Will Subsidising Private Health Insurance Help the Public Health System?," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 78(242), pages 277-283, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhou, Wenhui & Wan, Qiang & Zhang, Ren-Qian, 2017. "Choosing among hospitals in the subsidized health insurance system of China: A sequential game approach," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 257(2), pages 568-585.
    2. Alfons Palangkaraya & Jongsay Yong & Elizabeth Webster & Peter Dawkins, 2009. "The income distributive implications of recent private health insurance policy reforms in Australia," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 10(2), pages 135-148, May.

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