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Optimal health insurance: the case of observable, severe illness

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  • Chernew, Michael E.
  • Encinosa, William E.
  • Hirth, Richard A.

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  • Chernew, Michael E. & Encinosa, William E. & Hirth, Richard A., 2000. "Optimal health insurance: the case of observable, severe illness," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 585-609, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:19:y:2000:i:5:p:585-609
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin Gaynor & Deborah Haas-Wilson & William B. Vogt, 2000. "Are Invisible Hands Good Hands? Moral Hazard, Competition, and the Second-Best in Health Care Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(5), pages 992-1005, October.
    2. David M. Cutler & Mark McClellan, 1996. "The Determinants of Technological Change in Heart Attack Treatment," NBER Working Papers 5751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-277, June.
    4. Martin Feldstein & Jonathan Gruber, 1995. "A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 9, pages 103-130, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. David M. Cutler & Elizabeth Richardson, 1999. "Your Money and Your Life: The Value of Health and What Affects It," NBER Chapters, in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, volume 2, pages 99-132, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. James R. Baumgardner, 1991. "The Interaction between Forms of Insurance Contract and Types of Technical Change in Medical Care," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 36-53, Spring.
    7. Garber, Alan M. & Phelps, Charles E., 1997. "Economic foundations of cost-effectiveness analysis," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 1-31, February.
    8. Zeckhauser, Richard, 1970. "Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 10-26, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mark Shepard & Katherine Baicker & Jonathan Skinner, 2020. "Does One Medicare Fit All? The Economics of Uniform Health Insurance Benefits," Tax Policy and the Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-41.
    2. Avi Dor & William Encinosa, 2010. "How Does Cost‐Sharing Affect Drug Purchases? Insurance Regimes in the Private Market for Prescription Drugs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 545-574, September.
    3. Ching‐To Albert Ma & Michael H. Riordan, 2002. "Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(1), pages 81-107, March.
    4. Boone, Jan, 2018. "Basic versus supplementary health insurance: Access to care and the role of cost effectiveness," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 53-74.
    5. Christopher T Robertson & Andy Yuan & Wendan Zhang & Keith Joiner, 2020. "Distinguishing moral hazard from access for high-cost healthcare under insurance," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 15(4), pages 1-17, April.
    6. Kevin E. Pflum, 2015. "Physician Incentives and Treatment Choice," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(4), pages 712-751, October.
    7. Helmchen Lorens A. & Encinosa William E. & Chernew Michael E. & Hirth Richard A., 2013. "Integrating Patient Incentives with Episode-Based Payment," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(1), pages 123-136, May.
    8. Reza Yaesoubi & Stephen Roberts, 2010. "A game-theoretic framework for estimating a health purchaser’s willingness-to-pay for health and for expansion," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 358-377, December.
    9. Liu, Ting & Ma, Ching-to Albert, 2013. "Health insurance, treatment plan, and delegation to altruistic physician," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 79-96.
    10. Boone, J., 2014. "Basic versus Supplementary Health Insurance : The Role of Cost Effectiveness and Prevalence," Discussion Paper 2014-065, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. van Kleef, R.C. & van de Ven, W.P.M.M. & van Vliet, R.C.J.A., 2009. "Shifted deductibles for high risks: More effective in reducing moral hazard than traditional deductibles," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 198-209, January.
    12. Çağatay Koç, 2005. "Health‐Specific Moral Hazard Effects," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 72(1), pages 98-118, July.
    13. Boone, J., 2014. "Basic versus Supplementary Health Insurance : The Role of Cost Effectiveness and Prevalence," Other publications TiSEM be4cbf5b-f13b-460a-a9cc-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    14. Karolin Becker & Peter Zweifel, 2005. "Cost Sharing in Health Insurance: An Instrument for Risk Selection?," SOI - Working Papers 0513, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich.

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