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Campaign Contributions with Swing Voters

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  • Manfred Dix
  • Rudy Santore

Abstract

We analyze contributor behavior when there are two types of voters: positioned voters, who care about the ideological positions of candidates, and swing voters, who care about only the leadership abilities of candidates. Campaign expenditures, which are funded by contributions, are assumed to influence voters' perceptions of a candidate's ability. We find that the number of swing voters may have unexpected consequences on equilibrium campaign contributions. In particular, total contributions may increase as the number of swing voters decreases. Elections are won by doing two things: mobilizing your base and winning the independent swing voters. (Karl Rove, campaign strategist for George W. Bush)

Suggested Citation

  • Manfred Dix & Rudy Santore, 2003. "Campaign Contributions with Swing Voters," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 285-301, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:3:p:285-301
    DOI: 10.1111/1468-0343.00125
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shaun M. Tanger & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & David N. Laband, 2011. "Does Bill Co-sponsorship Affect Campaign Contributions?: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2008," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2011-09, Department of Economics, Auburn University.

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