Soft money and hard choices: Why political parties might legislate against soft money donations
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-005-7169-y
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- Tahiru Azaaviele Liedong, 2022. "The Liability of Tribe in Corporate Political Activity: Ethical Implications for Political Contestability," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 181(3), pages 623-644, December.
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