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On The Concept Of Power In Economics

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  • Pranab Bardhan

Abstract

In this paper we start with the standard definition of power and indicate how orthodox neoclassical economics fails to handle some of the key issues of power. In Sections II and III we discuss in the context of recent advances in economic theory some of the battlefields, so to speak, for the exercise of power: bargaining games in Section II and economic organizations and capitalist authority relations in Section III. In all of this we focus on the underlying structural factors. In the last Section we discuss some problems with both the behavioral and structural concepts of power.

Suggested Citation

  • Pranab Bardhan, 1991. "On The Concept Of Power In Economics," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 265-277, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:3:p:265-277
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00050.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Alchian, Armen A & Demsetz, Harold, 1972. "Production , Information Costs, and Economic Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 777-795, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniele De Luca, 2024. "A mathematical theory of power," Papers 2401.16406, arXiv.org.
    2. Hazel Johnson, 1996. "Vulnerability to food insecurity among Honduran maize farmers: Challenges for the 1990s," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 8(5), pages 667-682.
    3. Epstein, Stephan R., 1992. "Regional fairs, institutional innovation and economic growth in late medieval Britain," Economic History Working Papers 22450, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    4. Genicot, Garance & Ray, Debraj, 2006. "Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 71-100, November.
    5. Genicot, Garance, 2002. "Bonded labor and serfdom: a paradox of voluntary choice," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 101-127, February.
    6. Schaffner, Julie Anderson, 1995. "Attached farm labor, limited horizons and servility," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 241-270, August.
    7. Soham Baksi & Pinaki Bose & Marc T. Law, 2021. "Coercion, Obnoxious Tasks, and Economic Efficiency," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 177(1), pages 120-134.
    8. Daniele De Luca, 2023. "Power relations in Game Theory," Papers 2307.14170, arXiv.org.
    9. Naqvi, Nadeem & Wemhoner, Frederick, 1995. "Power, coercion, and the games landlords play," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 191-205, August.
    10. Moiseenko, Elena, 2018. "Becker’S Economic Theory In The Genesis Of The Institute Of Economic Power In Modern Ukraine," EUREKA: Social and Humanities, Scientific Route OÜ, issue 5, pages 47-51.
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    12. Palmer-Jones, Richard & Jackson, Cecile, 1997. "Work intensity, gender and sustainable development," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 39-62, February.

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