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Foreign lobbying through domestic subsidiaries

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  • Jieun Lee

Abstract

How much of lobbying activities disclosed under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) actually represent foreign clients? What are their interests? By identifying the global ultimate owners of all corporate clients filing with the LDA, I find that majority‐owned subsidiaries of foreign multinational corporations (MNCs) account for nearly 20% of corporate lobbying spending in 2015–2016. This amount is comparable to the entire foreign lobbying spending reported under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). Domestic subsidiaries of foreign MNCs are also found to lobby more frequently and spend more lobbying than American multinationals, after controlling for firm size, industry, and PAC contributions. These subsidiaries actively lobby on issue areas that clearly benefit their foreign parents. The findings suggest that foreign MNCs may actively influence U.S. policies through their domestic subsidiaries, and that the FARA captures only part of foreign lobbying in the United States.

Suggested Citation

  • Jieun Lee, 2024. "Foreign lobbying through domestic subsidiaries," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 80-103, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:36:y:2024:i:1:p:80-103
    DOI: 10.1111/ecpo.12232
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    References listed on IDEAS

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