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Does Firm Size Matter? Analyzing Business Lobbying in the United States

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  • Drope, Jeffrey M.
  • Hansen, Wendy L.

Abstract

In the study of corporate political activity in the United States, scholars have consistently relied on samples comprised entirely or principally of large firms. While scholars have raised the issue of bias in these samples, there have been no systematic examinations of the consequences for causal inference. We address this issue directly by comparing the results of comprehensive models that examine corporate lobbying using both large-firm and randomly-generated samples. We find that while there are some notable differences, they are certainly not so large as to lead us to question fundamentally the results of decades of scholarship. In short, the results generated using a random sample lead to causal inferences largely consistent with those in the theoretical and empirical literature. In particular, firms' resources and interactions with government condition both their decisions to lobby and the level of their activity.

Suggested Citation

  • Drope, Jeffrey M. & Hansen, Wendy L., 2006. "Does Firm Size Matter? Analyzing Business Lobbying in the United States," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 1-17, August.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:buspol:v:8:y:2006:i:02:p:1-17_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Ivo Bischoff & Stefan Krabel, 2017. "Local taxes and political influence: evidence from locally dominant firms in German municipalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 24(2), pages 313-337, April.
    2. John C. Coates IV, 2012. "Corporate Politics, Governance, and Value Before and After Citizens United," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(4), pages 657-696, December.
    3. Ka Zeng & Karen Sebold & Yue Lu, 2020. "Global value chains and corporate lobbying for trade liberalization," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 409-443, April.
    4. Anil R. Doshi & Glen W.S. Dowell & Michael W. Toffel, 2011. "How Firms Respond to Mandatory Information Disclosure," Harvard Business School Working Papers 12-001, Harvard Business School, revised Jun 2012.
    5. Jeffrey Kucik, 2012. "The Domestic Politics of Institutional Design: Producer Preferences over Trade Agreement Rules," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 95-118, July.
    6. Kim Jin-Hyuk, 2008. "Corporate Lobbying Revisited," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(2), pages 1-25, September.
    7. Jieun Lee, 2024. "Foreign lobbying through domestic subsidiaries," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(1), pages 80-103, March.
    8. Egerod, Benjamin C. K. & Aaskoven, Lasse, 2024. "Why don't firms lobby? How information shapes the market for lobbying services," Working Papers 347, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    9. Jennifer Abel-Koch, 2013. "Endogenous Trade Policy with Heterogeneous Firms," Working Papers 1306, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 01 Aug 2013.

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