Information and the Optimal Ownership Structure of Firms
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- Garrouste, Pierre & Saussier, Stephane, 2005.
"Looking for a theory of the firm: Future challenges,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 178-199, October.
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"Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
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More about this item
Keywords
Vertical integration; Bargaining inefficiency; Private information; Property rights;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-MIC-2003-03-14 (Microeconomics)
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