Budget Committee And Intergovernmental Transfer: Evidence From South Korea
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DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12905
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Cited by:
- Jung, Hoyong, 2022. "Voter Turnout Effects on Local Public Finance and Legislation: Evidence from South Korea," Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, vol. 63(1), pages 1-23, June.
- Kang, Youngho & Lee, Dongwon & Min, Sujin, 2025. "Ideology, intergovernmental transfers, and public health spending: Evidence from South Korea," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
- Lee, Dongwon & Min, Sujin, 2023. "Participatory budgeting and the pattern of local government spending: Evidence from South Korea," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
- Lee, Dongwon & Min, Sujin & Park, Sangwon, 2024. "Political budget cycle and the alignment effect: Evidence from South Korea," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
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