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Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process

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  • Rohde, David W.
  • Shepsle, Kenneth A.

Abstract

This paper examines the committee assignment process for Democratic members of the House of Representatives. Unlike previous studies of committee assignments, this paper employs data on the requests for assignments submitted by members to the Committee on Committees. The theoretical perspective employed is one in which all the participants in the process are rational actors who have goals they want to achieve and who choose among alternative courses of action on the basis of which alternative is most likely to lead to the achievement of those goals. We argue that the allocation of committee assignments affects the goals of all the participants in the process, and thus we consider the choices of actors in the process in terms of their goals; specifically the goals of re-election, influence within the House, and good public policy. After first considering the process from the point of view of the member making requests, we show that the member's requests are related to the type of district he represents, and that the number of requests he makes is related to such considerations as whether he is a freshman, whether he faces competition from a member from his state, and whether there is a vacancy from his state on his most preferred committee. The process is also considered from the point of view of the members making the assignments. Decisions on assignments are found to be affected by seniority (where success in getting requested committees is inversely related to seniority), margin of election (where members from marginal districts are more successful), and region (where southerners are less successful than members from other regions).

Suggested Citation

  • Rohde, David W. & Shepsle, Kenneth A., 1973. "Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(3), pages 889-905, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:67:y:1973:i:03:p:889-905_14
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    Cited by:

    1. James M. Snyder & David Strömberg, 2010. "Press Coverage and Political Accountability," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 118(2), pages 355-408, April.
    2. Hyun‐A Kim & Dongwon Lee & Sangwon Park, 2020. "Budget Committee And Intergovernmental Transfer: Evidence From South Korea," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 58(4), pages 1894-1906, October.
    3. Ashutosh Thakur, 2021. "Matching Politicians to Committees," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 088, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    4. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
    5. Kenneth Shepsle, 1975. "Congressional committee assignments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 55-78, June.
    6. Philippe Aghion & Mathias Dewatripont & Caroline Hoxby & Andreu Mas-Colell & André Sapir, 2010. "The governance and performance of universities: evidence from Europe and the US [Distance to frontier, selection, and economic growth]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 25(61), pages 7-59.
    7. Philippe Aghion & Mathias Dewatripont & Caroline M. Hoxby & Andreu Mas-Colell & André Sapir, 2009. "The Governance and Performance of Research Universities: Evidence from Europe and the U.S," NBER Working Papers 14851, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Milyo, Jeffrey, 1997. "Electoral and Financial Effects of Changes in Committee Power: The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Reform, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the Money Committees in the House," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 93-111, April.

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