Observability and Overcoming Coordination Failure in Organizations. An Experimental Study
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- Jordi Brandts & David Cooper, 2006. "Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations: An experimental study," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(4), pages 407-423, December.
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More about this item
Keywords
Incentives; Coordination; Observation; experiments; Organizations;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
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