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Dynastic Political Privilege And Electoral Accountability: The Case Of U.S. Governors, 1950–2005

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  • GEORGE R. CROWLEY
  • WILLIAM S. REECE

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  • George R. Crowley & William S. Reece, 2013. "Dynastic Political Privilege And Electoral Accountability: The Case Of U.S. Governors, 1950–2005," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(1), pages 735-746, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecinqu:v:51:y:2013:i:1:p:735-746
    DOI: j.1465-7295.2012.00476.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
    2. Lott, John R, Jr, 1990. "Attendance Rates, Political Shirking, and the Effect of Post-Elective Office Employment," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 28(1), pages 133-150, January.
    3. Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Jason Snyder, 2009. "Political Dynasties," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(1), pages 115-142.
    4. Laband, David N & Lentz, Bernard F, 1985. "Favorite Sons: Intergenerational Wealth Transfers among Politicians," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(3), pages 395-414, July.
    5. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1995. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(3), pages 769-798.
    6. Smart, Michael & Sturm, Daniel M., 2013. "Term limits and electoral accountability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 93-102.
    7. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
    8. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
    9. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    10. John Lott & W. Reed, 1989. "Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 75-96, April.
    11. Lott, John R, Jr & Bronars, Stephen G, 1993. "Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 76(1-2), pages 125-149, June.
    12. Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. J. Sebastian Leguizamon & Casto Martin Montero Kuscevic, 2019. "Party Cues, Political Trends, And Fiscal Interactions In The United States," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(4), pages 600-620, October.
    2. Daniel J. Smith & George R. Crowley & J. Sebastian Leguizamon, 2021. "Long live the doge? Death as a term limit on Venetian chief executives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 188(3), pages 333-359, September.
    3. J. Sebastian Leguizamon & George R. Crowley, 2016. "Term limits, time horizons and electoral accountability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 23-42, July.

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