Getting Over the Hump: A Theory of Crime, Credit and Accumulation
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & José A. Scheinkman, 1996.
"Crime and Social Interactions,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 111(2), pages 507-548.
- Edward E. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1995. "Crime and Social Interactions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1738, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1995. "Crime and Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 5026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999.
"Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(1), pages 83-116.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1998. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?"," Working Papers 98007, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Robert E. Hall & Charles I. Jones, 1999. "Why Do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output per Worker than Others?," NBER Working Papers 6564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fender, John, 1999. "A general equilibrium model of crime and punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 437-453, July.
- Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2008.
"Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?,"
Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 213-218,
Springer.
- Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-414, May.
- Mancur Olson, 1996. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government: Big Bills Left on the Sidewalk: Why Some Nations Are Rich, and Others Poor," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 3-24, Spring.
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(2), pages 169-169.
- Barro, Robert J & Mankiw, N Gregory & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1995.
"Capital Mobility in Neoclassical Models of Growth,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 103-115, March.
- Barro, R. & Mankiw, G., 1992. "Capital Mobility in Neoclassical Models of Growth," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1615, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Barro, R.J. & Mankiw, N.G. & Sala-i-Martin, X., 1992. "Capital Mobility in Neoclassical Models of Growth," Papers 655, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Robert J. Barro & N. Gregory Mankiw & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1994. "Capital mobility in Neoclassical models of growth," Economics Working Papers 82, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Robert J. Barro & N. Gregory Mankiw & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 1992. "Capital Mobility in Neoclassical Models of Growth," NBER Working Papers 4206, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert J. & Mankiw, N Gregory & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1994. "Capital Mobility in Neoclassical Models of Growth," CEPR Discussion Papers 1019, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Baumol, William J., 1996.
"Entrepreneurship: Productive, unproductive, and destructive,"
Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 3-22, January.
- Baumol, William J, 1990. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(5), pages 893-921, October.
- Baland, J-M & Francois, P, 1997. "Rent-Seeking, Resource Booms and the Size of the Entrepreneurial Class : A Theoretical Analysis," Papers 191, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
- Sah, Raaj K, 1991.
"Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-1295, December.
- Sah, R.K., 1990. "Social Osmosis And Patterns Of Crime: A Dynamic Economic Analysis," Papers 609, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
- Richard B. Freeman, 1994. "Crime and the Job Market," NBER Working Papers 4910, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Usher, Dan, 1989.
"The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1031-1044, December.
- Dan Usher, 1986. "The Dynastic Cycle and the Stationary State," Working Paper 671, Economics Department, Queen's University.
- Grossman, Herschel I & Kim, Minseong, 1995. "Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1275-1288, December.
- Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 1997. "A Theory of Trickle-Down Growth and Development," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 64(2), pages 151-172.
- Acemoglu, Daron, 1995.
"Reward structures and the allocation of talent,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 17-33, January.
- Daron Acemoglu, 1993. "Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent," CEP Discussion Papers dp0143, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Isaac Ehrlich, 1996. "Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 43-67, Winter.
- Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 1999. "Dissuader le crime," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9902, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Fender, John, 1999. "A general equilibrium model of crime and punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 437-453, July.
- Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 1999. "Dissuader le crime : un survol," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 123-147, mars-juin.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Lloyd-Ellis, Huw & Marceau, Nicolas, 2003. "Endogenous insecurity and economic development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 1-29, October.
- Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 2011.
"Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation,"
Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 136-147, January.
- Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2004. "Competition in Law Enforcement and Capital Allocation," Cahiers de recherche 0408, CIRPEE.
- Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2007. "Competition in Law Enforcement and Capital Allocation," Discussion Papers dp07-03, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University.
- Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 1999. "Dissuader le crime : un survol," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 75(1), pages 123-147, mars-juin.
- Paulo Barelli & Samuel De Abreu Pessôa, 2012. "Rent‐Seeking And Capital Accumulation," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 50(2), pages 399-417, April.
- Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2006.
"Incentive and incarceration effects in a general equilibrium model of crime,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 214-229, February.
- Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2001. "Incentive and Incarceration Effects in a General Equilibrium Model of Crime," Seminar Papers 696, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2001. "Incentive and Incarceration Effects in a General Equilibrium Model of Crime," Research Papers in Economics 2001:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
- Utz Weitzel & Diemo Urbig & Sameeksha Desai & Mark Sanders & Zoltán J. Ács, 2015.
"The good, the bad, and the talented: Entrepreneurial talent and selfish behavior,"
Chapters, in: Global Entrepreneurship, Institutions and Incentives, chapter 2, pages 24-41,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Weitzel, Utz & Urbig, Diemo & Desai, Sameeksha & Sanders, Mark & Acs, Zoltan, 2010. "The good, the bad, and the talented: Entrepreneurial talent and selfish behavior," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 64-81, October.
- Utz Weitzel & Diemo Urbig & Sameeksha Desai & Mark Sanders & Zoltan Acs, 2010. "The Good, the Bad, and the Talented: Entrepreneurial Talent and Selfish Behavior," Post-Print hal-00856604, HAL.
- Paolo Buonanno, 2003. "The Socioeconomic Determinants of Crime. A Review of the Literature," Working Papers 63, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2003.
- Jan U. Auerbach, 2019. "Property rights enforcement with unverifiable incomes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 701-735, October.
- Bruce Weinberg & Eric Gould & David Mustard, 1998. "Crime Rates and Local Labor Market Opportunities in the United States: 1979-1995," Working Papers 98-11, Ohio State University, Department of Economics.
- Barelli, Paulo & Pessôa, Samuel de Abreu, 2002.
"A model of capital accumulation and rent-seeking,"
FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE)
449, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
- Paulo Barelli & Samuel de Abreu Pess, 2002. "A Model of Capital Accumulation and Rent-Seeking," Penn CARESS Working Papers 4392bb4732a00ee414b60ef8a, Penn Economics Department.
- Martin Wittenberg, 2008. "To Prey Or Not To Prey? Welfare And Individual Losses In A Conflict Model1," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 76(2), pages 239-265, June.
- Eaton, B.Curtis & Wen, Jean-François, 2008. "Myopic deterrence policies and the instability of equilibria," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 609-624, March.
- Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2017.
"Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 245-295.
- Daron Acemoglu & Matthew O. Jackson, 2014. "Social Norms and the Enforcement of Laws," NBER Working Papers 20369, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nunn, Nathan, 2007.
"Historical legacies: A model linking Africa's past to its current underdevelopment,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 157-175, May.
- Nathan Nunn, 2005. "Historical Legacies: A Model Linking Africa's Past to its Current Underdevelopment," Development and Comp Systems 0508008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Nunn, Nathan, 2007. "Historical legacies: A model linking Africa's past to its current underdevelopment," Scholarly Articles 33077823, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Paolo Buonanno & Daniel Montolio & Paolo Vanin, 2009.
"Does Social Capital Reduce Crime?,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 145-170, February.
- Paolo Buonanno & Daniel Montolio & Paolo Vanin, 2006. "Does Social Capital Reduce Crime?," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0029, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
- Paolo Buonanno & Daniel Montolio & Paolo Vanin, 2006. "Does Social Capital Reduce Crime?," Working Papers (-2012) 0605, University of Bergamo, Department of Economics.
- Thierry Verdier & Yves Zenou, 2004.
"Racial Beliefs, Location, And The Causes Of Crime,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 731-760, August.
- Verdier, T. & Zenou, Y., 2000. "Racial Beliefs , Location and the Causes of Crime," DELTA Working Papers 2000-26, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2003. "Racial Beliefs, Location and the Causes of Crime," Working Paper Series 602, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2000. "Racial Beliefs, Location And The Causes Of Crime," CEPR Discussion Papers 2455, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kenneth Burdett & Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2003.
"Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1764-1777, December.
- Kenneth Burdett & Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2002. "Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-029, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Sep 2003.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2015.
"Status concerns as a motive for crime?,"
International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 46-55.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2013. "Status Concerns as a Motive for Crime?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4225, CESifo.
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Status concerns as a motive for crime?," DICE Discussion Papers 93, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Kenneth Burdett & Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2004.
"An On-The-Job Search Model Of Crime, Inequality, And Unemployment,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 681-706, August.
- Kenneth Burdett & Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2003. "An On-the-Job Search Model of Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-030, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Natkhov, T. & Polishchuk, L., 2017. "Political Economy of Institutions and Development: The Importance of Being Inclusive. Reflection on "Why Nations Fail" by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson. Part I. Institutions and Economic Devel," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 12-38.
More about this item
Keywords
Crime; property rights economic development; credit markets;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- N43 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Europe: Pre-1913
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-DGE-1998-10-15 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-PKE-1998-10-15 (Post Keynesian Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cre:crefwp:65. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Stéphane Pallage (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/crefeca.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.