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Trump, Twitter, And Treasuries

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  • Peter Tillmann

Abstract

After appointing Federal Reserve Chairman Powell, President Trump put pressure on the Fed to cut interest rates. We show that, on average, a statement from Trump on the Fed led to lower long‐term interest rates, consistent with expectations of lower expected future short rates. However, the impact of Trump's statements declined over time. (JEL E52, E43, E32)

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Tillmann, 2020. "Trump, Twitter, And Treasuries," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(3), pages 403-408, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:coecpo:v:38:y:2020:i:3:p:403-408
    DOI: 10.1111/coep.12465
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles L. Weise, 2012. "Political Pressures on Monetary Policy during the US Great Inflation," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 33-64, April.
    2. Burton A. Abrams, 2006. "How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 177-188, Fall.
    3. Demiralp, Selva & King, Sharmila & Scotti, Chiara, 2019. "Does anyone listen when politicians talk? The effect of political commentaries on policy rate decisions and expectations," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 95-111.
    4. Antoine Camous & Dmitry Matveev, 2019. "Furor over the Fed : Presidential Tweets and Central Bank Independence," Staff Analytical Notes 2019-33, Bank of Canada.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Ehrmann, Michael & Wabitsch, Alena, 2022. "Central bank communication with non-experts – A road to nowhere?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 69-85.
    2. Massimo Ferrari Minesso & Frederik Kurcz & Maria Sole Pagliari, 2022. "Do words hurt more than actions? The impact of trade tensions on financial markets," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 37(6), pages 1138-1159, September.
    3. Travis Adams & Andrea Ajello & Diego Silva & Francisco Vazquez-Grande, 2023. "More than Words: Twitter Chatter and Financial Market Sentiment," Papers 2305.16164, arXiv.org.
    4. Donato Masciandaro & Oana Peia & Davide Romelli, 2024. "Central bank communication and social media: From silence to Twitter," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 365-388, April.
    5. Machus, Tobias & Mestel, Roland & Theissen, Erik, 2022. "Heroes, just for one day: The impact of Donald Trump’s tweets on stock prices," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C).
    6. Andrea Ajello & Diego Silva & Travis Adams & Francisco Vazquez-Grande, 2023. "More than Words: Twitter Chatter and Financial Market Sentiment," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2023-034, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. Carola Binder, 2021. "Presidential antagonism and central bank credibility," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 244-263, July.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles

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