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How we (should?) study Congress and history

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  • Sarah Binder

    (George Washington University)

Abstract

Applying an array of quasi-experimental designs, proponents of causal inference approaches to studying American politics are setting their sights on the study of Congress. In many ways, that focus makes sense: improved research design allows us to draw stronger analytical inferences from observational data, bolstering our understanding of legislative politics. But are the pursuit and methods of causal inference equally well suited to the study of Congress and history? In this article, I consider the application of causal inference methods in historically oriented studies of Congress. Drawing from my coauthored work on the interdependence of Congress and the Federal Reserve over the Fed’s first century and earlier work on the institutional evolution of Congress, I point to the tradeoffs between knowledge and certainty that are endemic in causal inference approaches—and arguably especially so in the study of Congress and history.

Suggested Citation

  • Sarah Binder, 2020. "How we (should?) study Congress and history," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(3), pages 415-427, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:185:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00693-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00693-5
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Congress; History; Federal Reserve; Monetary politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • N00 - Economic History - - General - - - General
    • H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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