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Lobbying And Elections

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  • Jan Klingelhöfer

Abstract

I analyse the interaction between post‐election lobbying and the voting decisions of forward‐looking voters. The existing literature has shown that in models with citizen candidates from a dispersed distribution of preferences, lobbying has no influence on implemented policy. In my model with ideological parties, lobbying is shown to have an effect on policy. In terms of welfare, I show that the median voter and the majority of voters can be better off with lobbying.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Klingelhöfer, 2019. "Lobbying And Elections," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 1-17, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:71:y:2019:i:1:p:1-17
    DOI: 10.1111/boer.12148
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    References listed on IDEAS

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