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Competitive Tendering and Contracting Out: An Introduction

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  • Stephen P. King

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  • Stephen P. King, 1994. "Competitive Tendering and Contracting Out: An Introduction," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 27(3), pages 75-78, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ausecr:v:27:y:1994:i:3:p:75-78
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8462.1994.tb00850.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Froeb, Luke M. & Koyak, Robert A. & Werden, Gregory J., 1993. "What is the effect of bid-rigging on prices?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 419-423.
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    Cited by:

    1. Helen Owens, 2004. "Rail Reform Strategies: The Australian Experience," NBER Chapters, in: Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region, pages 279-303, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Helen Owens, 2003. "Rail Reform Strategies: The Australian Experience," NBER Working Papers 9592, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Neal Ryan & Craig Furneaux & Anthony Pink & Kerry Brown, 2005. "Public Sector Contracting: An Australian Study of Changing Work Conditions," management revue - Socio-Economic Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 16(4), pages 438-457.

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