IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/10194.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Rail Reform Strategies: The Australian Experience

In: Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region

Author

Listed:
  • Helen Owens

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Helen Owens, 2004. "Rail Reform Strategies: The Australian Experience," NBER Chapters, in: Governance, Regulation, and Privatization in the Asia-Pacific Region, pages 279-303, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10194
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10194.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stephen P. King, 1994. "Competitive Tendering and Contracting Out: An Introduction," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 27(3), pages 75-78, July.
    2. Louis S. Thompson, 1997. "The Benefits of Separating Rail Infrastructure from Operations," World Bank Publications - Reports 11562, The World Bank Group.
    3. Ioannis N. Kessides & Robert D. Willig, 1995. "Restructuring Regulation of the Railroad Industry," World Bank Publications - Reports 11650, The World Bank Group.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Helen Owens, 2003. "Rail Reform Strategies: The Australian Experience," NBER Working Papers 9592, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Neal Ryan & Craig Furneaux & Anthony Pink & Kerry Brown, 2005. "Public Sector Contracting: An Australian Study of Changing Work Conditions," management revue - Socio-Economic Studies, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, vol. 16(4), pages 438-457.
    3. Russell Pittman, 2004. "Russian Railways Reform and the Problem of Non‐discriminatory Access to Infrastructure," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(2), pages 167-192, June.
    4. Fitzová Hana, 2017. "European railway reforms and efficiency: Review of evidence in the literature," Review of Economic Perspectives, Sciendo, vol. 17(2), pages 103-120, June.
    5. Ioannis N. Kessides, 2004. "Reforming Infrastructure : Privatization, Regulation, and Competition," World Bank Publications - Books, The World Bank Group, number 13525.
    6. Desmaris, Christian, 2014. "The reform of passenger rail in Switzerland: More performance without competition," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 290-297.
    7. Julio Cesar Alonso & Israel Fainboim Yaker & Carlos Jorge Rodriguez & Juan Benavides, 2001. "Participación privada en proyectos de infraestructura y determinantes de los esquemas contractuales adoptados: El caso colombiano," Research Department Publications 3111, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    8. Juan J. Montero, 2014. "Rail Transport: A Balance Sheet," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers p0413, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    9. Rong, Zhang & Bouf, Dominique, 2005. "How can competition be introduced into Chinese railways?," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 345-352, July.
    10. Tomeš, Zdeněk, 2017. "Do European reforms increase modal shares of railways?," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 143-151.
    11. Christian Desmaris, 2014. "The reform of rail passenger traffic in Switzerland: more performance without competition? [Une réforme du transport ferroviaire de voyageurs en Suisse : davantage de performances sans concurrence ," Post-Print hal-01077153, HAL.
    12. McCullough, Gerard J., 2015. "Constrained Market Pricing and Revenue Adequacy: Regulatory Implications for Shippers and Class I U.S. Freight Railroads," Staff Papers 207766, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    13. Kubli, Merla, 2018. "Squaring the sunny circle? On balancing distributive justice of power grid costs and incentives for solar prosumers," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 173-188.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design
    • L9 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:10194. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.