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Special Interest Protectionism and the Antebellum Woolen Textile Industry

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  • Grant D. Forsyth

Abstract

. Academic and nonacademic work focusing on special interest lobbying tends to ignore America's early history in favor of the 20th century, leaving the origins of the organized commercial lobby vague. Using the antebellum woolen textile industry as a case study, this article finds that this industry was one of the first to demonstrate the potential benefits of interstate, interindustry coalitions for rent‐seeking activities. Using pressure tactics frequently observed today, but innovative for the time, the industry was not only successful in obtaining relatively high legislated tariffs by 1828, it also altered the traditional congressional avenues for obtaining information from aggrieved parties. This article clearly demonstrates that organized and public lobbying by commercial interests has a longer history than is typically recognized.

Suggested Citation

  • Grant D. Forsyth, 2006. "Special Interest Protectionism and the Antebellum Woolen Textile Industry," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 65(5), pages 1025-1058, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajecsc:v:65:y:2006:i:5:p:1025-1058
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2006.00490.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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