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Digitalization of Property Relations in the Harberger System as a Catalyst for the Development of Communal Ownership

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  • I.V. Anokhov

Abstract

Theorists and practitioners have always focused on property and related relationships as they have a decisive effect on all other social processes. The aim of the article is to study the changes in attitudes towards property on the part of entrepreneurs after complete digitalization of economic activity and the implementation of the Harberger system. Based on the analysis of digitalization trends in economic relations, it is stated that maximum transparency of property rights and the income generated by it will be achieved. Encouraging a periodic change of ownership in the Harberger system may lead to a regime of “non-property”. The consequence of these processes will be the impossibility of obtaining a positive profit in the long term, relying solely on tangible property. To write the article, the methodology of the Theory of Inventive Problem Solving was used, with the help of which the consequences of digitalization of property relations and the implementation of the Harberger system are assessed. In accordance with this theory, the article identifies the following elements of ownership used in production activities: “engine”, “working body”, “transmission”, “calculator”, “energy source”. It is stated that digitalization will lead to the autonomy of these elements and the removal of restrictions on access to them for most business entities. Thus, the differences in the methods of combining resources among various entrepreneurs are radically reduced. The article substantiates the thesis that entrepreneurial activity will be preserved only in those segments of the economy that can operate without the participation of a computer and where it is possible to use a communal form of ownership using highly specific assets. The consequence of these processes will be the division of today's property owners into administrators and entrepreneurs. The main provisions and conclusions of the article can be used to develop measures to maintain entrepreneurial activity in the new conditions. A radical contraction of the sphere of entrepreneurship and its transition to a communal form of ownership will require fundamentally different qualities from the entrepreneurs themselves: cooperation, non-rivalry; trust, long-term alignment of interests, unselfishness.

Suggested Citation

  • I.V. Anokhov, 2020. "Digitalization of Property Relations in the Harberger System as a Catalyst for the Development of Communal Ownership," Journal of Applied Economic Research, Graduate School of Economics and Management, Ural Federal University, vol. 19(2), pages 225-244.
    • Handle: RePEc:aiy:jnjaer:v:19:y:2020:i:2:p:225-244
    DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15826/vestnik.2020.19.2.012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    property; non-property; rights; digitalization; specificity; tax; Harberger; theory of solving inventive problems; communal property;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • E17 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications

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