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Incentives And Constraints In The Public Sector: The Behavior Of The Rentseeking Bureaucrat

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  • Assist. PhD Student Radu Simandan

    (Polytechnic University of Bucharest Department of Management Romania)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyze the incentives and constraints that a typical bureaucrat face in his or her daily activity and to present some conclusions related to the most likely behavior of bureaucrats. We begin by analyzing the behavior toward advantage seeking. We then apply the hypothesis of rent-seeking behavior to the activity of bureaucrats. After discussing the main differences between the incentives and constraints of the managers of privately owned enterprises and bureaucrats, we conclude that the activity of rent-seeking characterizes the activity of bureaucrats. Finally, we identify the rule of law as the best institutional arrangement for discouraging the rent-seeking activity of bureaucrats.

Suggested Citation

  • Assist. PhD Student Radu Simandan, 2009. "Incentives And Constraints In The Public Sector: The Behavior Of The Rentseeking Bureaucrat," Revista Tinerilor Economisti (The Young Economists Journal), University of Craiova, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, vol. 1(13), pages 81-84, NOVEMBER.
    • Handle: RePEc:aio:rteyej:v:1:y:2009:i:13:p:81-84
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William A. Niskanen, 1994. "Bureaucracy And Public Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 333.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    institutional analysis; rent-seeking; bureaucracy; rule of law.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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