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Factors Affecting Welfare Gains From Fishing Gear Restrictions

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  • Anderson, Eric E.

Abstract

While the use of gear restrictions to regulate fishing activity seldom has the objective of improving economic efficiency, it is capable of achieving that result under some conditions. It can also reduce economic efficiency. This paper explores the way several factors affect the sign and magnitude of welfare gains from fishing gear restrictions. These factors include, among others: the fixity or variability of the price of fish and the presence or absence of diminishing short-run average product of effort. Some generalizations are offered regarding the characteristics of fisheries in which gear restrictions are most likely to produce welfare gains.

Suggested Citation

  • Anderson, Eric E., 1988. "Factors Affecting Welfare Gains From Fishing Gear Restrictions," Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association, vol. 17(2), pages 1-11, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:nejare:28839
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.28839
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/28839/files/17020156.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Henderson, J. V. & Tugwell, M., 1979. "Exploitation of the lobster fishery: Some empirical results," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 287-296, December.
    2. Brown, Gardner, Jr, 1974. "An Optimal Program for Managing Common Property Resources with Congestion Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(1), pages 163-173, Jan.-Feb..
    3. J. M. Gates, 1974. "Demand Price, Fish Size And The Price Of Fish," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 22(3), pages 1-12, November.
    4. Lee G. Anderson, 1985. "Potential Economic Benefits from Gear Restrictions and License Limitation in Fisheries Regulation," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 64(4), pages 409-418.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Nicolas Querou & Agnès Tomini, 2014. "Ecosystem considerations in a second-best world," Post-Print hal-01123390, HAL.

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